A New Possibility for Logos Christology
Through Encounter with Buddhism:
Tillich and Takizawa Critically
Considered and Compared*

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Table of Contents:
PART ONE
Introduction
I. Tillich's Logos Christology and Buddhism
   A. Quasi-Religions and the Religious Situation of Today
   B. The Normative Basis for the Theological Understanding of Religions: Jesus the Christ
   C. Dynamic Typology and Buddhism

PART ONE:
Introduction:

It is extremely interesting to note that in encounter and dialogue with world religions the possibility of a new development of Logos Christology is in the process of being sought in the present-day global theological arena. For this indicates that the renewal of apologetic theology or missiology is only authentically realizable by the Logos-concept as it is worked out in dialogical terms. Theological exclusivism as embodied in such mission slogans of genuine evangelical Christianity as “Win the world for Christ” is now to be replaced by a more open attitude toward other Ways, but on the condition that Christians renew and retain their conviction about Christianity's truthfulness as inclusive of the uniqueness and universalism of its own core, Jesus as the Christ. In considering this requirement Robert D. Young suggestively states in his book *Encounter with World Religions*:
...the only way to do justice to both a uniqueness that can breed intolerance and a universalism that can degenerate into relativism is by reconsidering some form of logos Christology.¹

We know that the past missionary movement culminated on the Protestant side, for instance, in the First World Missionary Conference at Edinburgh in 1910 under the general theme of “The Immediate Conquest of the World,” concomitant with its theological expression such as Julius Richter’s inaugural address before the senate of the theological faculty of Berlin on his appointment to the chair of the Science of Missions. Richter declared:

Mission apologetics is that branch of theology which in opposition to the non-Christian religions, shows the Christian religion to be the Way, the Truth and the Life; which seeks to dispossess the non-Christian religions and to plant in their stead in the soil of heathen national life the evangelic faith and Christian life.²

This famous passage has led Young to notice attentively that “…what we are dealing with in the Christian faith is not an exclusivism that remains provincial and quiet, but one that is a hard-driving force.”³ This is particularly true of the global situation in which we find ourselves today after the Soviet Russia as a Communist super power establishing itself in opposition to the United States and its Western allies has suddenly collapsed and disappeared in 1991. For the demise of the Soviet Russia has left the world-wide political vacuum in which we now are beginning to observe the strong resurgence of Christendom in the name of “global governance” as a religio-political power on a global scale while some people, including Samuel Huntington, speaking of “The Clash of Civilizations?” with Christendom at its center.
It is exactly in this connection that we need to acknowledge that a group of intuitive theologians—such as Paul Tillich in the final stage of his career (whom I might designate as “Tillich II” in distinction from the Tillich of *Systematic Theology* who is to be called “Tillich I”), Katsumi Takizawa, and John B. Cobb, Jr.—began their original thinking in order to eliminate, or more correctly, to transform, the total framework of the conventional “arrogant” Christianity. They have unanimously found the Logos-concept anew from the biblical tradition as that which is at once universal and concrete.

Their contributions, on the one hand, are not restricted within the boundary of “theology” in the traditioinal sense, inasmuch as the Logos, as it has been re-discovered by them, is universal, extending even beyond the walls of the Christian Church. Yet, on the other, they are not merely dispassionate, objectivistic observers of world-events including history of religions. By contrast, the *Religionswissenschaft* scholars belonging to the preceding generations, such as Nicolai Hartmann, Rudolf Eucken, and Ernst Troeltsch, although they were committed Christians in their personal lives and belief-systems, strove to show the superiority of Christianity against the background of their common desire to find the naturalistic, objectively observable, origin of religious ideas. Such is not the case, however, with the above-mentioned theologians. Their common concern is for a normative understanding of world-events, especially of world religions. Thus, “theology of religions,” to borrow a suggestive term proposed by another prominent original theological thinker, Wolfhart Pannenberg, is their common interest, and it is the name of a newly emergent discipline of theology.

Since the publication of Paul F. Knitter’s *No Other Name?*: *A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes Toward the World Religions* in 1985, however, the discipline of theology of religions has entered a new era: he has sub-divided the category of inter-religious tolerance into two classes: Inclusivism (or Christo-centrism) and Pluralism (or Theo-centrism). Now the
above-mentioned intuitive theologians are considered (and, I think, to a certain extent mistakenly) under the general heading of Christo-centric Inclusivism as opposed to Theo-centric Pluralism, which is Knitter's own position. Knitter's major idea is that, while Christo-centric inclusivists, as is typically characteristic of Karl Rahner's theory of "anonymous Christians" in reference to other religionists, tend to think of including other world religions within their own realm of Christ, Theo-centric pluralists (including John Hich and Knitter himself) can account for the existence of other religions as manifesting equally authentically the noumenal Deity as such who is beyond and above the realm of manifestation or appearance or incarnation.

As a result, it appears that Christo-centric inclusivists are presumptuous to think of other religionists as included within the Christ-figure at no request of their own, whereas Theo-centric pluralists are truly open-minded due to their supra-religious notion of "Theos". Is this really an ideal situation for authentic inter-religious dialogue? I think not. Why not? Because it seems to me that (1) the notion of Christ Christo-centric inclusivists of the Rahnerian type espouse is not really deep enough to be incarnate and alive in every one of us even apart from the Christ-figure in Jesus of Nazareth and that (2) there is, in the vision of God Theo-centric pluralists present, no reference to their crucial capability of clarifying God's own ontological" (an sich) relatedness to us humans—even prior to the appearance of God "for us" (für uns), for instance, in the Incarnation of the Word of God in the life and history of Jesus of Nazareth.

This double issue, however, is inherent in the Logos-concept as it is elucidated and articulated by our two authors, Paul Tillich and Katsumi Takizawa, if I am correct. What we need in our contemporary attempt at constructing Logos Christology anew are, accordingly, a deeper knowledge of Christ and a closer vision of God. But how can this double requirement be satisfied in due measure?
In what follows let me study comparatively the ways in which Paul Tillich and Katsumi Takizawa try to answer the above question in search of a new possibility of Logos Christology for today, especially in encounter and dialogue with Buddhism. I propose to critically survey the characteristics of their respective Logos Christologies: (1) in their confrontations with the present-day religious situation; (2) in their struggles to find a normative basis for the theological understanding of religions; (3) in their encounters and dialogues with Buddhism; and (4) in their theological definitions of the Logos. Other examples of Logos Christology will also be referred to in terms of the Christian interpretation of Buddhism.

I. Tillich’s Logos Christology and Buddhism

Tillich’s Logos Christology appears quite distinctive in his significant attempt at interpreting Buddhism, Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions (first given as the four Bampton Lectures for 1962 in the fall of 1961 in the Law Memorial Library of Columbia University, and published in 1963). He holds that in early Christianity the judgment of other religions was determined by the idea of the Logos. Moreover, it is important for him to observe that the Church Fathers emphasized the universal presence of the Logos, the Word, the principle of divine self-manifestation, in all religions and cultures. For if we see this fact in the new light of the present encounter with the world religions, it shows that “early Christianity did not consider itself as a radical-exclusive, but as the all-inclusive religion in the sense of the saying: ‘All that is true anywhere in the world belongs to us the Christians’.”

Here Tillich presents himself as a Logos-centric inclusivist. But the crucial question is, Of what kind? For it seems to me that what he thinks by the Logos is not really identical with what Rahnerian inclusivists mean to say by their Christo-centric inclusivism as it expresses itself in the idea of “anonymous Christians.” Tillich’s reference to the Logos as “the principle of
divine self-manifestation, in all religions and cultures” rather sounds, at least to me, like Theo-centric pluralism of the Hickian type except for the fact that what lies at the center of his theological thinking in this context is the Logos, but not the noumenal God as in the case of Hick and Knitter.

The kind of a Logos-centric inclusivist that Tillich is, is characterized by himself by reference to his theological posture as “an observing participant” in the history of religions. As such, he was quite aware of the theological situation of the early 1960’s. Tillich characterized it by way of negation when he referred to his two basic decisions in his last public lecture (“The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian,” delivered on October 12, 1965) as follows:

A theologian who accepts the subject, “The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian,” and takes this subject seriously, has already made, explicitly or implicitly, two basic decisions. On the one hand he has separated himself from a theology which rejects all religions other than that of which he is a theologian. On the other hand if one accepts the subject affirmatively and seriously, he has rejected the paradox of a religion of non-religion, or a theology without theos, also called a theology of the secular.5

For Tillich, the theological task during his final years in the 1960’s lay between two extreme attitudes toward religions: exclusivism as manifested in the theology of Karl Barth and relativism as most sharply expressed in the so-called theology-without-God language or death-of-God theology. In a word, he dealt with a religious Way other than Christianity as “another or different fragmentary manifestation of theonomy or of the Religion of the Concrete Spirit” (FR, 80).

This understanding of other religious Way(s) in Tillich’s Logos Christology reminds me of the Far Eastern Buddhist–Barthian
thinker Katsumi Takizawa’s view of religions as “various, particular reflections or echoes within the setting of this world of the absolute source of actual human life, of the common basis of all humankind, or of the True ‘Dharma,’ namely, the one Logos inherent in this source.” However, there is one important difference between their thoughts: what Takizawa calls “the absolute source” is not “religion” at all insofar as it is the real ground of the whole life and history of humankind, including a true religion, whereas Tillich’s idea of “theonomy” can be equated, as is shown above, with “The Religion of the Concrete Spirit.”

This difference might have resulted from their respectively different understandings of what the Logos truly is like. I will consider this issue in detail later. At the present stage of my presentation, though, let me confirm and stress one important common feature observable in their thoughts: they both regard religions as “manifestations” or “reflections” of the Logos.

A. Quasi-Religions and the Religious Situation of Today

One of the prominent Buddhist dialogue-partners of Tillich, Masao Abe has written a critical review article on Tillich’ Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions. Abe agrees with Tillich that the main characteristic of the present encounter of the world religions lies not so much in their mutual encounter as in their encounter with the quasi-religions of today. Noticeably enough, however, Abe prefers the terms “irreligion” or “anti-religion” to “quasi-religion.”

By quasi-religions Tillich means Fascism, Communism, and Liberal Humanism. He does not use the term “pseudo-religions” because this is for him as imprecise as it is unfair. “Pseudo,” in his view, indicates an intended but deceptive similarity; by contrast, “quasi” indicates a genuine similarity, not intended, but based on points of identity. And he holds that this latter mode, certainly, is “the situation in cases like Fascism and Communism, the most extreme examples of quasi-religions
today” (CEWR, 5). At any rate, it seems to me that by using the concept of “quasi-religion(s)” Tillich was able to probe theologically into the religious semantics of modern secular society. This concept, in other words, has turned out to be a useful weapon for his theology of culture as this becomes aware of itself in confrontation with the religious situation of today. In my own opinion, Tillich has thus cultivated a new avenue to envisioning the political realm of apologetic theology or missiology by way of Logos Christology—the realm which Paul F. Knitter nowadays wants to articulate by his idea of “Kingdom-centered mission.” Let me scrutinize Tillich’s attempt in comparison with Takizawa’s Logos Christology of politics as follows:

1. Tillich’s success in this regard, in my view, would be achievable only as far as his definition of “religion” underlying the concept of “quasi-religion” was sufficiently workable. His definition of religion is famous: “Religion is the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern, a concern which qualifies all other concerns as preliminary and which itself contains the answer to the question of the meaning of our life” (CEWR, 5). One can discern in this definition of religion some affinities to Schleiermacher’s idea of “schlechthinniges Abhaengigkeitsgefuehl” and to Rudolf Otto’s sense of “das Heilige.” In comparison with religion as thus defined, Tillich rightly observes in secular quasi-religions that the ultimate concern is directed towards objects like nation, science, a particular form or stage of society, or a highest ideal of humanity, which are then considered divine” (CEWR, 5). That is, at the core of Tillich’s understanding of quasi-religions is the notion of the misplaced directivity of the ultimate concern that takes various modes according to the objects with which people are ultimately concerned.

2. Tillich’s rightness in dealing with how quasi-religions appear does not necessarily mean, however, that he has correctly solved the question of why quasi-religions appear in the world at all as distinguishable from religions, whether theistic or
non-theistic. Unlike Tillich, Takizawa does not deal with the alienated structures of human mentality as revealed in the midst of modern society in terms of a general idea (such as the notion of misplaced directivity of the ultimate concern). Rather, he considers such alienated structures as Fascism, Communism, and Liberal Humanism as resulting from humans' search for "free subjectivity" apart from the source of human life or the divine–human unity \textit{qua} the Logos that exists at the base of every human being where each and every person's fundamental–universal solidarity with the entire nature and all humanity does prevail.\textsuperscript{9} Takizawa sometimes depicts this state of affairs by reference to Pascal's idea of "divertissement" or self–forgetful amusement to which one is tempted to abandon oneself by what Karl Barth designates as "\textit{das Nichitige}" or mere nothingness (meaning the Satan) (RAMT, 154–5).

3. Yet, in accounting for the quasi–religious situation of today Tillich is keen enough to point out that the technological invasion of the traditional cultures and religions all over the world has resulted in "secularism and religious indifference" (CEWR, 13). He even refers to Japan's peculiar situation, saying: "The Christian missionaries there told me that they are much less worried about Buddhism and Shintoism than about the enormous amount of indifference towards all religions" (CEWR, 12). What he observes, then, as lacking in present–day Japan are two things: "the vocational elements in national life" (CEWR, 16) and "the spiritual roots of democracy" (CEWR, 25). Let me speak of them one after another.

First, within the purview of Tillich's political missiology it appears that a nation is determined by two elements: its natural self–affirmation as a living and growing power–structure; and, at the same time, the consciousness of having a vocation, namely, to represent and defend a principle of ultimate significance. And he thinks of the unity of these two elements as that which makes the quasi–religious character of nationalism possible. He takes up these examples:
[A] ...the Hellenistic people were conscious of representing culture as against the barbarians; Rome represented the law; the Jew the divine covenant with man; and medieval Germany the *corpus Christianum*, religiously and politically. The Italians were the nation of the rebirth (*Rinascimento*); the British represented a Christian humanism for all nations, especially the primitive ones; France represented the highest contemporary culture; and Russia the saving power of the East against the West; China was the land of the “center,” which all lesser nations encircled. And America is the land of the new beginning and the defender of freedom. And now this national idea has reached almost all parts of the world and has shown both its creative and its destructive possibilities. (CEWR, 16)

In Tillich’s opinion, although there is no nation in which the power element is lacking, in the sense of power to exist as an organized group at a definite place at a definite time, yet there are cases, though not very frequent, in which the vocational element is minimized by the power element. Examples to be noted are Bismarck’s Germany and Tojo’s Japan (CEWR, 17). And he holds that present-day Japan is still looking for a vocational symbol (CEWR, 17).

Second, despite the invasion into national life of a technological civilization and of a religiously indifferent secularism, Tillich notices attentively that the liberal–humanist and the Christian–Protestant ideas are an important reality in Japan, not measurable by statistics. And he even writes:

[B] Japan has gratefully received democracy from the hands of its conqueror, but democracy needs spiritual roots as well as sociologically favorable conditions. And they are lacking. Neither Shintoism nor Buddhism—and most Japanese are adherents of both religions at the same
time—has symbols or ideas which can become productive and protective for democracy. Thus it was possible for a demonically redicalized militaristic Fascism to come into power. It is now as hated in Japan as Nazism is in Germany, and the thinking people have asked themselves about the spiritual roots of democracy, and asked me to lecture on the subject. (CEWR, 25)

Then, here arises a question in my mind: How are “the vocational elements in national life” related to “the spiritual roots of democracy” in Tillich’s Logos Christological thinking about quasi-religion(s)? Does he have anything to say in answer to this question? Yes, of course. Let me quote the following passage:

[C] The future of all Asiatic and African nationalisms is dependent upon the character of their vocational consciousness and its relation to their will to power. If their quasi-religious claim is only a claim to national power, it is demonic and self-destructive; if it is united with a powerful vocational consciousness, imperialism can develop with a good conscience and produce empires in which creative and destructive elements are mixed. If the national consciousness is humanized and becomes aware both of its own finite validity and the infinite significance of that which it represents (though ambiguously), a nation can become a representative of the supranational unity of mankind—in religious language, of the Kingdom of God. (CEWR, 17)

It is clear above that Tillich is mindful enough to the relation between [A] “the vocational elements in national life” and [B] “the spiritual roots of democracy” in terms of [C] the notion of “representation.” The former represents the latter simply because, as I want to emphasize here, the former is truly loyal to the latter. It is crucial to note, with Takizawa, that,
all that Westerners (including Tillich) and most post-war Japanese intellectuals knew about Japan to the contrary, this state of affairs has been known to the Japanese people through the notion of the emperor’s seat (Jpn., za) or existence from ancient times. For him, the error of Japanese militarism during World War II is not attributable to this ancient Japanese tradition as such, but rather to its modernistic misunderstanding by the Japanese leaders and intellectuals themselves.

According to Takizawa, the emperor’s seat or existence signifies at least two to three dimensions as follows:

(1) The divine-human proto-relation as such as this inheres in the depths of the emperor’s existence insofar as he is also an individual person like other human beings.
(2) The emperor as he takes an actual form as a human subject while he sits at the central seat of Japan, as one of many nation states on earth representing the Logos, the universal ground of all humankind, in the world.
(2-a) The actual existence of the emperor as he represents in and through his seat the impeccability of the central seat of the state—the impeccability of the seat as such that cannot be lost irrespective of whether its actual forms are right or wrong, good or evil—that cannot but be known consciously as finally indispensable to the collective life of humanity.
(2-b) The emperor as he actually speaks and behaves as a heavily responsible person for the said central seat, while at the same time being an individual person like all other persons. (SFI, 348)

Takizawa thinks of dimension (2-b) as susceptible of moral and political critiques, but he perceives that dimension (2-a) cannot be the object of critiques in this same sense although it is not free from the critical scrutiny and understanding of every intelligent mind insofar as it is but a form of the human
subject who has come to be within history. (There is no actual form of one's human existence, in Takizawa's view, that can stand outside the pre-reflective and reflective or conscious critical scrutiny of it by oneself or others.) (SFI, 348) Furthermore, Takizawa adds another very crucial comment to the above-cited passage: "The only thing I want to say here is that it can be questioned to what degree the emperor's seat or existence is appropriate and adequate, especially in our global age, as a visible and tangible mode of expressing and representing the impeccability peculiar to the central status of the state that is necessarily urged to be from the bottom of the coming-to-be of the human subject" (SFI, 348).

Thus, it now turns out that the political realm of apologetic theology or missiology, as this has been considered by Tillich in terms of "the vocational element in politics" and by Takizawa in terms of "expressing and representing the impeccability peculiar to the central status of the state," are predicated upon its religious or ontological basis, namely what Tillich calls "the spiritual roots of democracy" which is comparable to what Takizawa refers to as "the bottom of the coming-to-be of the human subject." And it is precisely here that we should ascertain "the importance of Buddhist-Christian dialogue" (see I, C, below) in conjunction with "the task of judging religions by the principle of Jesus as the Christ, as far as the Christian perspective of the dialogue is concerned" (see I, B, below).

That is to say, the tasks of constructing Logos Christology anew and promoting Buddhist-Christian dialogue are now to be constituting the basic sciences for scrutinizing and establishing political missiology in search of a "New World Order" in our global age after the demise of the Soviet Union. In my opinion, Tillich's small masterpiece he has produced and bequeathed to us from out of his final theological struggle, is significant in its articulation of this threefold format and in its potential dialogical relationship with Takizawa's works on Christology, Buddhism and Christianity, and the Japanese mind.
B. The Normative Basis for the Theological Understanding of Religions: Jesus the Christ

In the second chapter of the afore-mentioned book Tillich deals with "Christian Principles of Judging Non-Christian Religions." First, he begins with introducing a rather general consideration concerning all religions and, even more generally, all social groups, and says: "If a group—like an individual—is convinced that it possesses a truth, it implicitly denies those claims to truth which conflict with that truth. I would call this the natural self-affirmation in the realm of knowledge; it is only another word for personal certainty" (CEWR, 28). At this level Christianity in encounter with other religions, as well as with quasi-religions, rejects their claims insofar as they contradict the Christian principle, implicitly or explicitly.

But it then turns out, secondarily, that the problem, as Tillich considers it consciously and seriously, is not the right of rejecting that which reject us; rather it is the nature of this rejection. He differentiates three cases: (1) the rejection of everything for which the opposite group stands; (2) a partial rejection together with a partial acceptance of assertions of the opposite group; and (3) a dialectical union of rejection and acceptance in the relation of the two groups (CEWR, 29). Tillich himself wants to take the third attitude toward other groups, religious and quasi-religious, while Karl Barth opts for the first position with regard to his attitudes toward other religions and quasi-religions, especially toward Nazism (in this case, with enough justice); Troeltsch's idea of "cross-fertilization" might be put in the second box—although only within the purview of cultural exchange to the exclusion of in-depth inter-religious dialogue (see CEWR, 44-45, 43, 46).

Third, referring to "the exclusive monotheism of the prophetic religion" in the same chapter, Tillich sharpens his own position and stresses the universal validity of justice, in the sense that "justice is a principle which transcends every particular religion and makes the exclusiveness of any particular..."
religion conditional” (CEWR, 32). This principle of “conditional exclusiveness” is crucial in his inquiry into the attitudes of Christianity toward the world religions. Tillich refers to Jesus’ words, for instance, in the grand scene of the ultimate judgment (Matt. 25: 31ff.) and in the story of the Good Samaritans as those which basically confirm this principle.

Fourth, more important, for Tillich, is the fact that Jesus as the Christ stands behind this principle manifested in Jesus’ words. The following quotations will clarify his point:10

[1] It is necessary [for the Christian theologian] to accept the vision of early Christianity that if Jesus is called the Christ he must represent everything particular and must be the point of identity between the absolutely concrete and the absolutely universal.11

[2] The first and basic answer theology must give to the question of the finality of the revelation in Jesus as the Christ is the following: a revelation is final if it has the power of negating itself without losing itself....Jesus of Nazareth is the medium of final revelation because he sacrifices himself completely to Jesus as the Christ. (ST, I, 133, 136)

[3] Jesus is the religious and theological object as the Christ and only as the Christ. And he is the Christ as the one who sacrifices what is merely “Jesus” in him. The decisive trait in his picture is the continuous self-surrender of Jesus who is Jesus to Jesus who is the Christ. (ST, I, 134)

It is precisely in accordance with these passages in Systematic Theology, Vol. I that Tillich has finally come to say in reference to “Christianity Judging Itself in the Light of Its Encounter with the World Religions” (Ch. Four) as follows:


It [the Christ event, which is the appearance and reception of Jesus of Nazareth as the Christ, a symbol which stands for the decisive self-manifestation in human history of the source and aim of all being] is a personal life, the image of which, as it impressed itself on his followers, shows no break in his relation to God and no claim for himself in his particularity. What is particular in him is that he crucified the particular in himself for the sake of the universal. This liberates his image from bondage both to a particular religion—the religion to which he belonged has thrown him out—and to the religious sphere as such; the principle of love in him embraces the cosmos, including both the religious and the secular spheres. With this image, particular yet free from particularity, religious yet free from religion, the criteria are given under which Christianity must judge itself and, by judging itself, judge also the other religions and the quasi-religions. (CEWR, 81-82)

At this stage of my presentation a word may be in order with regard to our other dialogue-partner Takizawa’s parallel grasp of Christology which provides for him a basis for dialogue with Buddhism. Actually, I am surprised to find that Tillich’s peculiar ideas—such as “the point of identity,” “the medium of final revelation,” and “the continuous self-surrender,” all referring to how Jesus of Nazareth related to the Christ—correspond point by point respectively to Takizawa’s concepts of “inseparable” (Jpn., fukabun), “irreversible” (fukagyaku), and “non-identical” (fukado) which he uses in order to understand and express the internal relation of Jesus to the Christ as this is re-enacted in the lives of his followers. Let me explain as follows:

(1) According to Takizawa, when the disciples experienced Jesus’ death on the cross and their inability to follow him
to the last as a grave tragedy and had fallen into despair
and then when they came to truly realize the hidden
"core" of Jesus' personality as the power of salvation and
creation which was here and now *inseparable* from their
own existence, the Christian confession "Jesus is the
Christ" first came into being.

(2) Takizawa, then, proceeds to state that the disciples,
therefore, understood the true meaning of Jesus' life up
until his death on the cross, as follows: the Logos—the
power of salvation and creation—took the *irreversible*, i.e.,
gracious, free, and decisive initiative to become flesh and
dwell among them so as to make them awaken to salvation.

(3) Third, Takizawa contends that the disciples for the
first time grasped the meaning of their lives on earth.
They realized that they could fulfill the divine purpose
inherent in their lives insofar as they reflected in themselves
the supreme light of the Lord Christ, or of the Logos, by
following Jesus. This divine purpose is inherent in every
life and yet is *not itself identical* with life.\(^\text{12}\)

Takizawa's view of Jesus the Christ—or his understanding
of how the Christian confession "Jesus is the Christ, the Son of
God" came to be—when carefully examined, however, can be
found slightly but crucially different from Tillich's afore-mentioned
thesis. Tillich presents the afore-mentioned threefold distinction
/relation between Jesus of Nazareth and the Christ, the incarnate
Logos. By contrast, Takizawa perceives this threefold distinction
/relation as resulting from the deeper dimension of Christology,
the Logos as such. From this perspective Takizawa differentiates
three dimensions in Jesus the Christ as follows:

(1) The substantial and necessary unity, along with
irreversible distinction, between God and the human
being.
(2-a) The functional and necessary unity, along with
irreversible distinction, between God and the human being.

(2-b) The contingent unity between God and a perfectly responsive man Jesus of Nazareth (inasmuch as it happened only at a particular time and in a particular place).

(SBC, 76)

In my own view, Takizawa's thesis 1 refers to the Logos, while thesis 2-a speaking of the Christ as the incarnate Logos and thesis 2-b of what Tillich calls "Jesus who is Jesus." By the term "unity" Takizawa shows that the Logos is not a third possibility besides God the Creator and humanity, but rather "is" at once God and humanity—that is, at once necessary and contingent. As such, the Logos is, for Takizawa, the fundamental mode of interrelatedness of God and humanity, which he refers to as the Proto-factum Immanuel (God with us).

In order to ascertain the locus theologicus of Takizawa's idea of the Proto-factum Immanuel at this juncture, it would be fitting for me to quote Tillich's words as follows: "The logos has been called the mirror of the divine depth, the principle of God's self-objectification. In the logos God speaks his 'word,' both in himself and beyond himself" (ST, I, 251); "The 'Word' is first of all the principle of the divine self-manifestation in the ground of being itself" (ST, I, 157). This clarification of the locus of the Logos by Tillich will become crucially suggestive, when it comes to discussing Takizawa's usage of the Proto-factum Immanuel in his critique of Hisamatsu's Zen studies (see II, A, 1).

At any rate, on this ontological level (thesis 1) God is, for Takizawa, already fundamentally with us—the fact that satisfies the requirement of the closer God we mentioned at the outset. Yet, on the functional level of incarnation (thesis 2-a) this God—with-us, namely the incarnate Logos or the Christ, is constituting the deeper core of our being that calls us into the business of self-creation repeatedly anew to which we (including
Jesus of Nazareth) respond on the contingent level of incarnation (thesis-b), in the case of Jesus in the manner of utter self-surrender, as was beautifully depicted by Tillich earlier. Thus, the requirement of the deeper Christ is also satisfied.

C. Dynamic Typology and Buddhism

In this paper my method is that of investigating and clarifying Tillich's viewpoints with regard to given questions while pointing out Takizawa's ones in comparison and contrast with them, and vice versa. Accordingly, thus far I have dealt with Tillich's Logos Christology not as a self-contained system but as a system open to dialogue with another system, Takizawa's Logos Christology that has arisen in the Far Eastern country, Japan, against a quite different background.

Takizawa started his intellectual career as an "anonymous" student of Kitaro Nishida, the founder of the Kyoto school of Buddhist philosophy while being a Zen meditator himself. As a matter of fact, Takizawa studied philosophy at Kyushu University, but not at Kyoto University where Nishida taught. Takizawa got interested in Nishida's philosophy and wrote an article entitled "Universals and Individuals" for the philosophy journal *Shiso* [Thought], August 1933. Nishida read it and sent a letter of appreciation on his own to Takizawa, an unknown young scholar—an unusual incident in the pre-war Japanese academia. When he was given a Wilhelm Humboldt scholarship to study in Germany in the early 1930's, Takizawa followed Nishida's advice to study with Karl Barth instead of Martin Heidegger because the latter lacked a crucial point in European thought, God. Thus, Takizawa's Logos Christology was formed under the synthetic influence of the Eastern and Western representative thinkers, Nishida and Barth. In this sense, Takizawa is almost by nature a specialist in the field of "Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions (especially Buddhism)."

By contrast, it was not until in his 70's that Tillich, the most brilliant Logos Christologist in the West in recent times,
realized an urgent necessity for the systematic theologian to study the history of religions. His dialogue with Japanese Buddhist thinkers during his visit to Japan in 1960 was in this respect monumental, not only in his professional career but also as an intellectual event between the East and West. In Japan, he declares, there was no question of his being "converted" to Zen or any other form of Buddhism. But rather, he had many opportunities to be introduced existentially into what were to him strange forms of religious life, forms which showed unconditional seriousness and ultimate concern apart from any Christian influence. Doubtless his famous methodology of "dynamic typology" in dealing with world religions, was first conceived in this connection. The method he intends to use is explained as follows:

The kind of dialectics which, I believe, is most adequate to typological inquiries is the description of contrasting poles within one structure. A polar relation is a relation of inter-dependent elements, each of which is necessary for the other one and for the whole, although it is in tension with the opposite element. The tension drives both to conflicts and beyond the conflicts to possible unions of the polar elements. Described in this way, types lose their static rigidity, and the individual things and persons can transcend the type to which they belong without losing their definite character. (CEWR, 55-56)

Here Tillich is in the process of going beyond a merely descriptive study of religions. Certainly he was so much attracted by history of religions that he even had a joint seminar on "History of Religions and Systematic Theology" with Mircea Eliade at Chicago. But his real interest was in the theology of the history of religions, or even in rewriting his Systematic Theology from this point of view, because he saw the whole history of religions as "a fight of God within religion against
religion” (FR, 88, italics mine).

Tillich’s existential concern for history of religions as a theologian as thus disclosed, however, is one thing, the question of the value of his “dynamic typology” is quite another. He has come to realize really insightfully that every living religion strives dynamically within itself in polarity and tension between the opposite elements. What he thus concerns himself with is “the question of the intrinsic aim of existence—in Greek, the telos of all existing things” (CEWR, 63). It is here, Tillich affirms, that one should start every interreligious discussion, and not with a comparison of the contrasting concepts of God, man, history, or salvation (CEWR, 63). Tillich uses no such merely objectivistic methods in arriving at his concepts as many philosophers of religion would cling to in arriving at theirs. Hence, Tillich’s conviction in dialogue with Buddhism as follows:

In the dialogue between Christianity and Buddhism two telos-formulas can be used: in Christianity the telos of everyone and everything united in the Kingdom of God; in Buddhism the telos of everything and everyone fulfilled in the Nirvana. (CEWR, 64)

But here arises a difficult problem: What really is Tillich’s reason for believing the Christian and the Buddhist telos-formula to be in such a state of polarity? Tillich’s answer to this question is based upon his understanding that both terms, the Kingdom of God and Nirvana, are symbols. To him, the former is the social, political, and personalistic symbol with its symbolic material being taken from the ruler of a realm who establishes a reign of justice and peace. The latter, on the other hand, is an ontological symbol with its material being taken from the experience of finitude, separation, blindness, and suffering with the effect that a solution to those existential problems is sought beyond finitude and error, in the image of the blessed oneness
of all things realized in the ultimate Ground of Being (CEWR, 64-65).

But, I ask: Are they merely symbols taken from different cultural contexts? If both of them have no literal relatedness with God and with what Tillich calls "the ultimate Ground of Being" in some important sense or another, they have no genuine existential meaning after all either for the Christian or for the Buddhist. Here I agree with Hartshorne who says: "Very literally we are 'in' God [i.e., what he as a Whiteheadian thinker calls the consequent or concrete nature of God], and all our properties are divine possession." Furthermore, I contend on my own that we are "in" the ultimate metaphysical "Ground of Being," and that all our properties are its occasions and exemplifications. And if we are at once "in" the personal God and in the ultimate metaphysical Ground of Being, this at-once-ness must be the very criterion and also the very unity of the contrasting telos-formulas, the Kingdom of God and Nirvana.

But the theological symbolism, with which Tillich's Logos Christology is significantly shot through, has led him to pursue a quite different way of comparing Christianity and Buddhism. First, he observes that the Christian symbol of the Kingdom of God and the Buddhist symbol of Nirvana are both based upon a negative valuation of existence: the Kingdom of God stands against the kingdoms of this world, namely, the demonic power-structures which rule in history and personal life, whereas Nirvana stands against the world of seeming reality as the true reality from which the individual things come and to which they are destined to return. Second, Tillich then wants to scrutinize decisive differences that arise from this common basis. He writes:

In Christianity the world is seen as creation and therefore as essentially good; the great Christian assertion, *esse qua esse bonum est*, is the conceptualization of the Genesis story in which God sees everything he has created "and
behold, it was very good." The negative judgment, therefore, in Christianity is directed against the world in its existence, not in its essence, against the fallen, not the created, world. In Buddhism the fact that there is a world is the result of an ontological Fall into finitude. (CEWR, 65)

Unfortunately, this is a total misunderstanding of the Buddhist view of the world of actualities. For the Buddhist, the world of actualities arise by the principle of dependent co-originination (Skr., *pratitya-samutpada*), while at the same time being absolutely affirmed by the metapsysical dynamism of Emptiness emtying itself, as was intuitively grasped and brilliantly dwelt upon by the great Mahayana Buddhist metaphysician Nagarjuna (150–250 C.E.). The net result of Nagarjuna’s argument for Emptiness (*sunyata*) is this: Emptiness is finally identical with (the world of actualities as it is governed by the principle of) dependent co-originination. It is precisely in tandem with this view that Masao Abe as a "self-staking participant" attacks Tillich's misunderstanding of Buddhism in these words: "Identity as an ontological principle of Nirvana is not identity with oneness which is substantial, but identity with absolute Nothingness."  

If we are attentive enough to this basic trait of the Buddhist world-view, we will be able to find a rather common procedure of arriving at the essential affirmation of the worldly actualities as a whole (albeit for different religio-philosophical reasons) in the representative thinkers of the both religioins, such as Anselm and Nagarjuna, as I have tried to show elsewhere.

This does not, of course, mean that Tillich’s knowledge of the consequences of the afore-mentioned basic difference between Buddhism and Christianity is meaningless and inadequate. He rather insightfully states: "The Ultimate in Christianity is symbolized in personal categories, the Ultimate in Buddhism in transpersonal categories, for example, 'absolute non-being'" (CEWR, 65–66). The only problem is how one can persuasively
compare these different symbols of the Ultimate on a legitimate basis.

In this respect, the above grave misunderstanding of what the Buddhist view of the world of actualities is like notwithstanding, Tillich nonetheless shows a clear case of Buddhist–Christian comparison by asking "whether the nature of the holy has not forced both sides to include, at least by implication, elements which are predominant in the other side" (CEWR, 66). He acknowledges that the symbol “Kingdom of God” appears in a religious development in which the holiness of the “ought to be” is predominant over the holiness of the “is,” and that the “protesting” element of the holy is predominant over the “sacramental” one. Significantly enough, this knowledge of Christianity provides him with perceiving a large amount of mystical and sacramental elements, and consequently ideas concerning God and humanity to approximate Buddhist concepts. Especially important, I think, is the fact Tillich has come up with the insight into the meaning of absolute nothingness in Buddhist thought in tandem with the esse ipsum, being itself, of the classical Christian doctrine of God as a transpersonal category.

Based upon the experience of the holy, but not upon a negative valuation of existence, Tillich is enabled to grasp that “there are indications in the history of both symbols that converging tendencies exist” (CEWR, 68). This is important, in my own view, in the sense that by virtue of the experience of the holy as this is linked up together with the existence of the Logos in the midst of our lives, now it is possible for us to study comparatively two conflicting and yet converging symbols in a really correlative manner. First, Tillich refers to the different ontological principles that lie behind the conflicting symbols, Kingdom of God and Narvana, namely, “participation” and “identity.” Tillich explicates: “One participates, as an individual being, in the Kingdom of God. One is identical with everything that is in Nirvana” (CEWR, 68).

Second, Tillich speaks of the ways in which the principles
of identity and participation become significant for the relation of the human person to other human person and to society. He can say, in considerably condensed form, that "participation leads to agape, identity to compassion" (CEWR, 70). For Tillich, compassion is a state in which he who does not suffer under his own conditions may suffer by identification with another who suffers. By contrast, agape accepts the other one, even the unacceptable, and tries to transform him, either directly, or indirectly by transforming the sociological and psychological structures by which he is conditioned, in the direction of what is meant by the "Kingdom of God." (CEWR, 71)

Third, Tillich takes up the problem of history as the one which comes into the foreground of the dialogue—and this in conjunction with the problem of agape. Now we are brought back again to the political realm of apologetic theology or missiology through the enterprise of Buddhist–Christian dialogue. Tillich clearly knows its principle which he depicts in these words:

Under the predominance of the symbol of the Kingdom of God, history is not only the scene in which the destiny of individuals is decided, but it is a movement in which the new is created and which runs ahead to the absolutely new, symbolized as "the new heaven and the new earth." (CEWR, 72)

But how can this transformative principle of history come to be in our lives in Japan that are governed by the principle of identity? This seems to me one of the most fundamental questions we need to ask in order to ascertain the importance of Logos Christology today. For the transformative principle of history is the historical, incarnate aspect of the divine self-manifestation of the divine depth, namely, the Logos. What I can see in the following passage is nothing other than Tillich’s articulation of
this same question:

Buddhist Japan wants democracy, and asks the question of its spiritual foundation. The leaders know that Buddhism is unable to furnish such a foundation, and they look for something which has appeared only in the context of Christianity, namely, the attitude toward every individual which sees in him a person, a being of infinite value and equal right in view of the Ultimate. Christian conquerors forced democracy upon the Japanese; they accepted it, but then they asked: How can it work if the Christian estimation of every person has no roots either in Shintoism or in Buddhism? (CEWR, 74)

Inherent in my question above, which is articulated by Tillich in his own way in the last sentence, is a concern with knowing the source of the transformative power in history. The Logos as the transformative power in history is an evocative power, in my own view, insofar as, as Tillich impressively explicates, "‘God manifest’—the mystery of the divine abyss expressing itself through the divine Logos—this is the meaning of the symbol, the ‘Word of God’" (ST, I, 159). If so, my question turns out to mean, in more precise terms: Whence does the evocative power in the universe as this expresses itself in and through the Logos come? Does it have nothing to do with the principle of identity, as Tillich seems to be presupposing when he says: Only if each person has a substance of his own is community possible, for community presupposes separation. You, Buddhist friends, have identity, but not community” (CEWR, 75)?
NOTES


10. I owe these excerpts from Tillich’s *Systematic Theology* to Young, EWR, 132.

Masao Abe, “Review Article: Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions,” 110.