Hartshorne and Hisamatsu on Human Nature: A Study of Christian and Buddhist Metaphysical Anthropology*

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1. Hartshorne and Hisamatsu in Terms of the Task of Metaphysical Anthropology Today

My intention in this article is to study comparatively Hartshorne and Hisamatsu as they investigate *metaphysically* human nature. Neither of them believes one can understand human nature on a purely human basis. One has to thoroughly break through humanistic anthropology in order to grasp humanity in its depths. As Hartshorne contends, “Life is enjoyed as it is lived; but its eventual worth will consist in the contribution it has made to something more enduring than any animal, or than any species of animal.”¹ In this sense, the life of humanity is comprehensible only as religious. And, significantly enough, according to Hartshorne, “he is most religious who is certain of but one thing, the world-embracing love of God.”²

Hisamatsu is also a firm believer in the metaphysical foundation of human nature. However, what he means by the foundation is not the God of Christian theism or the theistic Buddha, such as Amida Buddha. He, too, breaks through so-called humanistic anthropology, including Kant’s philosophy of morals and Max Scheler’s phenomenology of religion. But the lever, by means of which he wants to overcome that type of anthropology, is the Zen Buddhistic truth, Formless Self. It is in this sense that he says, “One cannot understand Godhead unless one utterly dies to humanity”³ or “Godhead does not arise from humanity nor depends upon it, but the reverse” (TM, 214).

Charles Hartshorne has until today, now in his late 90’s,
been the representative figure of the second generation of Whiteheadian process philosophy in North America. For this reason process philosophy/theology movement in North America, now outreaching to Europe and Japan, is called by the double name, Whiteheadian–Hartshornean. Shin’ichi Hisamatsu, on the other hand, who passed away at the age of 90 in 1980, has been regarded as one of the greatest Zen philosophical leaders, along with Keiji Nishitani, in contemporary Japan belonging to the second generation of the Nishida school. Both of them have radically humanized their respective mentors’ thoughts while never losing sight of their primal metaphysical traits, as mentioned above. Hartshorne has laid down the foundation of his metaphysical anthropology in the notion of “enduring individual” as appropriated by deity; hence all the important anthropological issues are centered upon, and are solved by, the pivotal point—the “immanence of God.” On the contrary, Hisamatsu based his thought concerning human nature upon the Buddha–nature intrinsic to all human beings, that is, upon Formless Self—to use his own terminology. That is to say, the notion of “self” is pivotal and transformative in his thinking to such an extent that he dares to conceive of the metaphysical ultimate—which Nishida called “absolute Nothingness,” “unity of opposites,” or “basho” (place)—in terms of “self.”

Concomitant with the different pivotal and transformative points in their respective schemes of metaphysical anthropology, Hartshorne is a theistic personalist, whereas Hisamatsu is a Zen a-theistic transpersonalist. This does not, however, mean that they do not share anything in common in the matter of metaphysical anthropology. On the contrary, they share in the understanding of human nature as involving, I assume, three axiological categories, i.e., intrinsic, intended instrumental, and pragmatic values. The axiological dimension of the universe, especially of human nature (or nature as it is lived by and as humans), is important insofar as it both includes in itself and presupposes the ontological or properly metaphysical dimension, the dimension
which is most typically characterized by Whitehead in his notion of "Creativity" or by Nishida in his conception of "unity of opposites." The former dimension concerns itself with life of the universe, especially human life, as it isprehended by a certain subject or subjects, whereas the latter dimension is related to the ultimate general principle of life of the universe, by virtue of which life is life, and by virtue of which each act ofprehension is viable.

I shall study Hisamatsu’s view of human nature in Section II and Hartshorne’s in Section III. As shall be shown, they both try respectively to solve the fundamental anthropological problem: how to synthesize self-concern and concern-for-others in anthropology. They both recognize that self-concern in its authentic form is possible only by the power of redemption—by the power of Formless Self in Hisamatsu’s case, and by the divine power in Hartshorne’s case. It follows, as both of them clearly see, that self-concern, realizing itself as the intrinsic value of human nature, necessarily entails concern-for-others, love or compassion as the embodiment of the intended instrumental value of human nature, thus achieving the synthesis of the two concerns. Up to this point they are alike.

However, it is when it comes to discussing the pragmatic value that their otherwise similar metaphysical anthropologies, as we shall elucidate, diverge from each other. Hisamatsu is well capable of explicating the livable aspect of the value but not its rationally defensible aspect. On the contrary, Hartshorne superbly accounts for the rationally defensible aspect of the value but cannot fully articulate the dynamics of the livable aspect, the dynamics of going beyond the rational—cum—existential antinomy here at the present moment.

Their respective abilities come from their favorite knowledges of either the metaphysical ultimate (i.e., Formless Self) or of the religious ultimate (i.e., the immanent God); and their respective weaknesses result from their lack of the knowledge of the other side of the ultimates. That is to say, Hisamatsu’s
ability of explicating the livable aspect is guaranteed by his knowledge of Formless Self as the intrinsic value of human nature, whereas Hartshorne’s merit of rationally defending the pragmatic value of human nature is undergirded by his insight into the all-embracing love of God, the love which alone can make the intended instrumental value really instrumental for the future; and their inabilities are for the reverse reasons.

The above is a cross-cultural re-discovery of the merit and demerit of the East and the West based upon an axiological analysis of human nature in the thoughts of two major representatives of the two cultures, Hisamatsu and Hartshorne. Our method of study deployed in this work is that of comparative articulation, in the sense of articulating one thinker’s system of thought by extensive confrontation with some other’s. As one of the major results of the study, it turns out that there are at least two ways of coping with the problem of modern times that explodes here and there even after relinquishing heteronomy or theonomy of the medieval type, i.e., the problem of how to break through the dilemma of autonomy: free but purposeless.

One is the way shown by Hisamatsu in his doctrine of Zen a-theism, the way of breaking through modernity deep beneath the ground of purposeless modernity toward an authentic purposelessness or bottomlessness, Formless Self. The other is the way presented by Hartshorne in his doctrine of neo-classical theism or panentheism, the way of overcoming modernity high above the culmination of modern freedom toward a real reason for freedom-cum-purpose, the all-embracing love of God. Either way is an invitation to post-modern axiology or a truly secular but at the same time highly religious love of life of the world.

But one serious question may finally arise: Can’t we synthesize the two ways in some way or another? That is to say: Can’t we be purposeless in the fashion of Hisamatsu’s Zen a-theism and yet purposive in the manner of Hartshorne’s neo-classical theism at the same time? Surely, that is one of the most crucial questions as regards the task of theological
consideration of life of the world today. However, there might be no easy answers to this question for us unless we scrutinize the problem of axiology carefully enough in all its details, including the intrinsic, intended instrumental, and pragmatic values.

But one hint is given by Hartshorne when he states as follows:

Goodness is the self in its purposes transcending the personal future and making itself trustee for others (according to religion, finally, trustee for God). In this transcendence of the personal there is a kind of ‘peace’ or ‘Nirvana,’ an escape from the agonies of egotism. This peace is the only essential reward of virtue. It is in the present and is not a looked-for reward in the eventual future. Rather, so long as one’s own future is taken as the important matter, there is no peace.5

This hint corresponds, to my mind, to the following words of Hisamatsu in the interview for the magazine Sekai (The World, February 1977):

I always say at home, “I’ll never die. I’ll never die because I am F [Formless Self]. I’ll never die because I’ve transcended time and space.” Nobody is likely to understand me, nobody... [laughter]. It’s usual, though, that nobody understands me. I never mind indeed my own death. For I have such an important work to do, Post-Modernist Movement! Unless this Movement works out some answers, our world cannot become a true world—this is my firm belief. (p. 241; trans. mine.)

II. Hisamatsu’s Theory of Human Nature

As is often said in Buddhism, “In both self-benefit and
benefiting others lies the perfection of Awakening and practice." One's own redemption is not everything, for that cannot be considered true redemption. Instead of being merely subjective and individual, true redemption ought to have an objective validity applicable to any person. Otherwise, as redemption, the saying "In both self-benefit and benefiting others lies the perfection of Awakening and practice" would not apply to it. 6

Thus writes Hisamatsu in an essay entitled "Ultimate Crisis and Resurrection, Part II: Redemption" (originally written in 1969). As is clear in this passage, the opposition between self-benefit and benefiting others can be resolved in the event of the Buddhist redemption according to Hisamatsu's theory of human nature. But how? What is, generally speaking, the ontological basis for breaking through the opposition in human nature of self-concern and concern-for-others? In this section, I will scrutinize how Hisamatsu tries coherently to answer this question, in terms of a three-dimensional value-structure of human nature, consisting of the "intrinsic," "intended instrumental," and "pragmatic" values.

A. Human Nature in Its Intrinsic Value

For Hisamatsu human nature constitutes a three-dimensional problem: it can best be expressed in terms of depth, width, and length. By depth he means probing the human being as deep as the bottom of his or her self-awareness and, finally, awakening to the Formless Self. 7 From the viewpoint of Zen enlightenment as awakening to the Formless Self, human nature is accordingly to be considered as a Self-to-self relationship; it is not a static nature as "substance" (in the Cartesian sense of a being who need nothing other than itself in order to exist). This Self-to-self relationship we might call the "intrinsic value" of human nature. Human nature in its depth is already value-pregnant even if it is considered irrespective of, or prior to, its active,
purposive relationship to others.

This reminds me of Hartshorne's elaboration on the intrinsic value of experiencing as follows:

The basic value is the intrinsic value of experiencing, as a unity of feeling inclusive of whatever volition and thought the experience contains, and exhibiting harmony or beauty. If we know what experience is, at its best or most beautiful, then and only then can we know how it is right to act; for the value of action is in what it contributes to experiences. (CSPM, 303)

1. The Buddha-Nature In more detail, the intrinsic value of human nature for Hisamatsu means that "all beings are of the Buddha (i.e., Awakened) nature." From this standpoint of Buddhism, "redemption is already present in every person. Sentient beings are, without exception, originally saved" ("UCR", II, 38; italics Hisamatsu's). By this Hisamatsu means that redemption is not what one is given from outside, that is a favor by external blessing in the form of revelation from Heaven or of Grace ("UCR", II, 38). He rejects any heteronomous or theonomous motivations in this regard.

To be sure, Hisamatsu admits that at present sentient beings are not yet awake to their Buddha-nature. Yet, he holds that it is nevertheless true that they are the Buddha, without any distinction between the savior and the saved ("UCR", II, 38). What is essential to his doctrine of redemption (and to his view of the intrinsic value of human nature) is the fact that the ground for the human being's redemption is basically inherent in him/her, and that its presence is the basic or ultimate moment in the human being, which makes his/her redemption possible ("UCR", II, 38). In short, as he affirms, Buddhism teaches that everyone has the possibility of being saved ("UCR", II, 38).

This is quite contrary to the Christian belief that "since
all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, they are justified by his grace as a gift, through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus, whom God put forward as an expiation by his blood, to be received by faith” (Rom. 3:23-25). However, if we take into account the fact that what Hisamatsu means by the term “possibility” is the metaphysical potency of existence, but not human possibility for progress as it has been believed by moderns (cf. TM, 216-7, 225-6), we will not be misguided by his discussion of the Buddha-nature. His bitter criticism of modern humanism as well as of medieval heteronomy/theonomy testifies to this deeper intention in his usage of the term “possibility.”

This can be made explicit and intelligible to Westerners, I believe, by Hartshorne’s process view of the principle of action for a truly rational animal as the “appeal of life for one’s present life, reality, or self rather than the appeal of a self for that same self; or even the appeal of other selves for the own self” (CSPM, xx; italics mine). By life Hartshorne means “creative synthesis” or “creativity” as the “ultimate abstract principle of existence” (CSPM, xv). This principle has broken through the “idea of substance, or individual thing or person, taken as not further analysable or reducible” (CSPM, xix), i.e., the idea which has broken down in microphysics, which is dispensable in cosmology, and which is, as Buddhism discovered two thousand years ago, inadequate in ethics and religion (ibid.).

What Hartshorne means by his notion of “creative synthesis” of all beings in the universe, including God, is the same thing as the Buddhist analysis of “substance” into units–events or momentary states. This notion, if it is taken in its original, Whiteheadian signification of all-encompassing Creativity, could further correspond to Hisamatsu’s notion of the Self or the True Self insofar as this latter notion signifies the totality of the universe as it is concrescing and realizing itself at the present moment as the human self. However, the fact is rather that here emerges one great difference between them: for the Buddhist atheist Hisamatsu the True Self is the ultimate,
all-encompassing Reality, whereas for the neo-classical theist Hartshorne the idea that love, as it is eminently fulfilled as deity, seeks what is more than love, say the formless Nothingness or Void or Absolute Beauty, is a “philosophical superstition” (NTfOT, 106). This is because for Hartshorne God is the only all-inclusive Reality in the universe as love.

2. The raison d’être of Religion It may follow from this that one denies, like Hartshorne, that Buddhism can offer an explicit alternative to the theistic version of the all-inclusive reality because the Buddhist refuses to rationalize what is given in “satori” or salvation. Then one, like Hartshorne, may come to this conclusion concerning Buddhism: “His [the Buddhist’s] doctrine is an intuitionism, not a speculative account of the Whole” (NTfOT, 22); or “‘Dependent origination’ and the goal of bringing all things to buddhahood suggest asymmetry, but the relation of this to nirvana is sheer mystery, so far as I can see.”

However, it is precisely at this point that Hisamatsu defends Buddhist intuitionism in terms of the raison d’être of religion. That is, he vindicates the intrinsic validity of Zen enlightenment for the salvation of humanity as such. For Hisamatsu, as one who seeks religion, is of the opinion that if religion were without a raison d’être not merely for him as an individual but for man per se, he would not be able to have a firm commitment to that religion but rather would readily relinquish it (“UCR”, I, 16). For him the raison d’être of religion is internally related to this question: Where in man does one find the “moment” whereby he needs religion? That is to say, Hisamatsu is concerned with the question of the place where in humankind—not in a particular individual—one finds the reason that religion must exist (“UCR”, I, 16).

It is obvious to Hisamatsu that what he calls theonomous religion of the medieval type as well as types of religion which precede it, such as animism and fetishism, belong to the past and have no raison d’être today. For ours is the age when
autonomous man’s self-awareness is the subject; the present age is the age of humanism ("UCR", I, 17). Then Hisamatsu’s quest for the raison d’être of religion has no other context than criticism of humanism itself, so that it will become criticism of the religion that is established on the ground of humanism ("UCR", I, 18).

At any rate, Hisamatsu’s quest for the raison d’être of religion, contrary to Hartshorne’s critical assumption that Buddhist insight into the Formless Self has no ultimate philosophical basis, demonstrates a dynamic togetherness of religious and philosophical concerns. Interestingly enough, however, this is unwittingly analogous to the case of Hartshorne’s neo-classical theism that has established itself through a radical break-through of both traditional transcendental theism (e.g., Thomas Aquinas) and humanistic naturalism (e.g., John Dewey) (see his Beyond Humanism, which we shall discuss later).

3. The Religious Moment in Humanity Now, it is time to see that the raison d’être of religion for modern man is rooted in what Hisamatsu calls the “religious moment in man” but not in external, heteronomous or theonomous motivations, as in the case of pre-modern man. However, this religious “moment” in humanity, as Hisamatsu critically analyzes it, first takes the reversed form, “sin and death.” This I might call the opus alienum—to use Luther’s terminology—of human nature in its intrinsic value, or of the Buddha–nature. Hisamatsu writes:

These two, sin and death, which ordinarily are separately considered, since they are each spoken of as the single or the grave “moment” for religion, can both be said to be the inevitable for man, and to open up man’s limitation. In other words, when the moment for religion in man is said to be sin and death, this means that sin and death constitute man’s limitation, and that they are what man can never overcome. ("UCR", I, 19)
As is clear in the above passage, (1) Hisamatsu is not, like humanists, optimistic of the goodness of human nature. Rather, he recognizes humanity’s radical limitation, sin and death. (2) Yet, his ultimate standpoint is that of the Formless Self of humanity, or of the intrinsic value of human nature. His philosophical insight into the Whole or the totality of the universe—that is, his metaphysics—is constituted by the paradoxical unity of these two seemingly conflicting propositions. In this regard, I would say, his Zen philosophy is a post-modern reinterpretation of the Mahayana Buddhist logic of the *hannya soku-hi*, or of *prajña*-intuition: A is not A and therefore A is A. Hisamatsu, I believe, has refuted in this way Hartshorne’s criticism of Buddhism mentioned earlier.

This observation of mine is confirmed by Hisamatsu’s thoroughgoing analysis of “sin and death” as constituting the religious “moment” in humanity and as necessitating redemption of humanity in a paradoxical fashion. What I mean by this is as follows. Hisamatsu holds that sin exists in science and art as well as in morality. This is because he believes we cannot be free from the opposition between falsity and truth in the world of science, or the contrast between ugliness and beauty in the world of art, even if we can get rid of sin in the moral sense. According to Hisamatsu, sin therefore ought to be extended to include the problem of reason *per se* (“UCR”, I, 20). That is to say, sin arises because humanity has ultimate antinomy in the very structure of reason, covering the whole field of humanity (“UCR”, I, 21). In this sense, Hisamatsu feels that “so-called original sin really does exist (although its myth is far from convincing to us today)” (*ibid.*). This sin he identifies as “man’s most basic kind of ignorance” (*ibid.*).

Likewise, Hisamatsu deepens the notion of death to the extent that it includes the very basic antinomy of existence, life-and-death. One should fear not death but life-and-death, or origination-and-extinction, which is not necessarily limited to humanity’s life-and-death but applies to everything. Thus,
finally, one must bring death to the very point of existence—and nonexistence. ("UCR", I, 23). What is called Great Death in Zen is nothing other than this ultimate state of death.

By sin Hisamatsu means the ultimate antinomy of the rational–irrational, which is found in the structure of reason; and by death he means the ultimate antinomy of existence—and—nonexistence, which lies at the bottom of life. Both antinomies, however, are one in their concrete reality; they are indivisible. For instance, the reason why the ultimate antinomy of life—and—death becomes pain or suffering in us is that we judge so (cf. "UCR", I, 24). Thus the one final ultimate antinomy, which includes in itself reason, value, and existence, really presses upon us and constitutes the true "moment" of religion (cf. "UCR", I, 24). In the midst of this moment of religion one's whole existence becomes a "great doubting-mass"—the one which completely differs quantitatively and qualitatively from the "doubt" in Descartes' De omnibus dubitandum ("Concerning the Necessity of Doubting Everything") ("UCR", I, 26).

This moment of religion entangled in the final, total, and all-inclusive doubt I would like to call the reversed expression of salvation, or of the True Self. For that which goes beyond good and evil, or beyond existence and nonexistence, is the original nature of the Self. In this connection Hisamatsu quotes remarks by the Sixth Partiarch of Zen in China, Hui-neng: "At the very time you do not think of good or evil... [you have] your original face"; and "At the very time you do not think of good or evil, please give back to me the Face that you had before your parents gave birth to you." The self prior to birth from one's parents means the Self without the nature of life—and—death, human nature in its intrinsic value.13

B. Human Nature in Its Intended Instrumental Value

Hisamatsu views the field of "width" or the standpoint of all humankind as commensurate with the fact that we all have Buddha—nature, that we are originally the Buddha, and that in
this respect human beings are all equal. He even thinks that the True Self may well be called Creator because “God or Buddha exists not outside but inside the Self and because it is present” (“UCR”, I, 29). This understanding or use of the term “Creator” may sound strange from the Christian point of view. But it would be intelligible, in my view, if we took it to mean something like Whitehead’s notion of “creativity,” because this latter notion includes in itself God as its primordial exemplification. Hisamatsu’s provocative proposition, “It is not that in the presence of an external God we are equal, which would be heteronomy” (“UCR”, I, 29), would therefore also be intelligible.

By virtue of this immediate connection of what he calls “width” with the Formless Self, Hisamatsu proceeds to assert that the enlightened person is liberated from the egoism of nationality or race, expands himself or herself to include the entirety of the human race, and thus stands on the perspective of “brotherly love for all humanity” (“UCR”, I, 12). That is to say, he is now attempting to conceive of human nature in its intended instrumental value from the perspective of the Formless Self. Is he justifiable in this attempt?

My answer to this question is both yes and no. (1) Yes, in the sense that Hisamatsu knows clearly that the intended instrumental value, or Goodness, of human nature lies in its contribution to the enrichment of the intrinsic value of humanity, Beauty. It is noteworthy that Hisamatsu in this regard is based upon the metaphysical insight that the source of the Buddha-with-form called Amida-Buddha is the Dharmakaya, the metaphysically ultimate Buddha-body. He quotes (“Zen”, 31) a passage each from Shinran’s Yuishinshō-mon’i (Notes on ‘Essentials of Faith Alone’) and jinen-honu-shō (On Naturalness) as follows:

The Dharmakaya is without shape, without form, and accordingly, beyond the reach of the mind, beyond description in words. That which takes form and comes forth from this Formless-Suchness is called the Upaya-dharmakaya.
The Supreme Buddha is without form. Because it is without form, it is called Self-effected. When we represent it with form, it cannot then be spoken of as the Supreme Nirvana. It is to make known this Ultimate Formlessness that we speak of Amida-Buddha.

To paraphrase the above into my own language, Amida is "loyal" to the Dharmakaya through and through in that he makes the Dharmakaya known to the world.

(2) However, I would reply no to the above question, on the other hand, in the sense that Hisamatsu fails to differentiate between the proper religious source of the intended instrumental value of humanity, i.e., Amida as the skillful means, and the aim or purpose of the fulfillment of this value, i.e., satori. The former has its own unique raison d'être as distinct from and prior to enlightenment as a human experience although the latter alone, we must acknowledge, is capable of effectuating in the heart of the enlightened compassion for the unenlightened. In my own language, what is at issue here is the truth that there is in the universe the supreme embodiment of the intended instrumental value in the sense of the "Great Vow of salvation of all the sentient beings," as this constitutes the principle of loyalty calling forth worship from sentient beings, Amida-Buddha. However, it is a pity that Hisamatsu simply wants to explain the figure of a Buddha as Other—namely, Amida—in terms of the theonomous projection of the compassionate structure of existence peculiar to the only true Buddha, the awakened human person.\(^{15}\)

In short, Hisamatsu’s self-styled Zen atheism betrays its limitations in the treatment of the intended instrumental value of human nature. On the contrary, it is Hartshorne who provides a theistic basis for this value. For him, the intrinsic value of experiences is by definition aesthetic value. In contrast, ethical value, goodness, is not the value of experiences themselves,
but rather the intended instrumental value of acting insofar as the actor acts so as to increase the intrinsic value of future experiences, particularly those of others (CSPM, 308). Thus far Hartshorne shares the same view as Hisamatsu’s. However, he differs from Hisamatsu in that he holds:

Whereas the Buddhist tries to will directly the good of all, the theist wills above all the good of the Eminent One by whom all are cherished. So the theist, too, wills the good of all, but in such fashion that the whole of reality, an ever-growing unity, is taken as both inclusive object and inclusive subject of love. (“TAWT”, 411)

C. Human Nature in Its Pragmatic Value

In the preceding two sub-sections, I have elucidated two things: (1) As far as the intrinsic value of human nature is concerned, Hisamatsu is right in clarifying that its properly metaphysical source lies in the Formless Self or the Dharma-kaya, which includes in itself the religious ultimate, God or Amida; and (2) as far as the intended instrumental value of human nature is concerned, although Hisamatsu has rightly perceived that this value in the form of compassion has its aim in enriching the intrinsic value of experiencing, satori, he fails to acknowledge the religious source of this value, i.e., Amida or God. As a result, his Zen atheism forms a direct contrary, in the matter of the ultimates, to Hartshorne’s neo-classical theism, a view that the concrete nature of God is the all-inclusive reality. That is to say, Hisamatsu’s all-encompassing notion of the Self is antagonistic to Hartshorne’s notion of the Eminent One as Love. Here we have an opposition between transpersonal Zen atheism and eminently personal panentheism.

However, it is interesting to notice that Hisamatsu and Hartshorne share a common view that the experience here–now (e.g., satori) entails compassion. Hartshorne refers, for example, to the case of good will, which is “twice good: it enriches
one’s own present experience and in its consequence tends to enrich future experiences, not necessarily one’s own” (CSPM, 308). However, it is still true that this common view cannot resolve the above philosophical antagonism. For in order to resolve it, we have to probe into the true state of affairs as regards how the experience here–now (i.e., self-benefit) corresponds at the present moment to its future consequences (i.e., benefiting others) especially in accordance with the ultimate sources of both of them.

In this regard, I would contend as follows. In my perception, aimlessness and aim co–constitute the experience here–now. Ontologically, aimlessness is undergirded by the metaphysical potency, the Formless Self and aim is enabled by the religious ultimate, God or Amida–Buddha. What is noteworthy here is the fact that God or Amida means what Whitehead designates as “the primordial nature of God” or what Katsumi Takizawa conceives as “the Proto–factum Immanuel” (i.e., the primordial unity of God and humanity), namely, the agent who initiates aims in the world. This nature of God, curiously enough, is untouched by Hisamatsu and Hartshorne in their discussion of compassion or love. For Hisamatsu, this nature of God does not exist; hence, he holds Zen a–theism. For Hartshorne, it can only be the abstract aspect of the concrete nature of God, who is affected by and receives all the worldly actualities; hence, he professes panentheism.

If aim and aimlessness, as I hold, co–constitute the experience here–now, then they are at the same time thereby manifesting a deeper truth that the Formless Self and the primordial nature of God co–constitute the realm of the ultimates. To be sure, the former ultimate, insofar as the intrinsic value of experiencing is concerned, includes in itself the latter ultimate; in Buddhist terms, they are therefore both called Dharmakaya—the former perperly as such and the latter in the capacity of “upaṭṭha” (expedient). But when it comes to discussing the intended instrumental value of experiencing, a converse expression
is possible: it is God who supremely includes or embodies in Godself the Formless Self and thus primordially characterizes it.

It is precisely from this perspective that we proceed to consider our third subject-matter in this section, the pragmatic value of human nature in the thought of Hisamatsu. Hisamatsu conceives of what he terms “length” as “forming history on the basis of the two other dimensions of man’s being”; for him “length” issues from “the first and the second perspective, depth and width” ("UCR", I, 13). From his viewpoint of the self, the self once reaches to its depth, from out of which it moves in width or extension in such a manner that it covers the whole humankind which forms history; thus, and only thus, the self obtains length ("UCR", I, 13). In other words, length, for Hisamatsu, means “living the life of history while transcending history” ("UCR", I, 13).

1. The Livable Aspect of Pragmatic Value It is quite noteworthy that Hisamatsu emphasizes freedom in the midst of our living the life of history. He prizes the act of living the life of history insofar as it is free and spontaneous, in the sense that it never becomes a dead past or the object of clinging. The pragmatic value of human nature as it expresses itself as history, therefore, should all the time be “livable” anew, I assume, for Hisamatsu. It is in this sense that he writes:

...it is only when one is free—even while constantly forming history—not only from what has been formed but also even from the work of formation itself that we can speak of forming history while transcending history. ("UCR", I, 13)

The “livable” aspect of the human pragmatic value, embodied as history, is, in this sense, religious. “Religion must of necessity have the meaning of transcending history” (ibid.). For Hisamatsu there are two interpretations of transcendence in religion. One is the view that religious time of a completely
different order from historical time intersects the latter. According to this view the intersection itself is actual time as the present of religious time. Then the part before it crosses the present is considered the past and the part after the crossing is regarded as the future. Hisamatsu finds a concrete embodiment of this view in the Buddhists' so-called “three lives” as non-identical with the past, present, future of historical time. The “three lives” are rather the time originating from somewhere completely beyond history and entering this human world of history, which after entering, finishes and leaves the actual historical time (“UCR”, I, 14). It is his contention in this conjunction that such an understanding of time is a necessary result of the idea that a Buddhaland or a Pure Land cannot be sought within this actual, historical world of man (ibid.).

When people consider man's originally being a Buddha on the basis of such religious time—Hisamatsu proceeds to assume—they may naturally think of the original Buddhahood in the previous life; on the other hand, they may naturally think of attaining rebirth in the Pure Land as the matter of a future life in religious time. In short, this view of history in terms of religious time is actually apart from what we nowadays call world history. Hisamatsu even regards it as a mere postulate or a rationally deduced conclusion “by analogy with the causal relationships which are established in historical time” (ibid.).

It is precisely in opposition to this view of religious time as transcendence of history that Hisamatsu holds a different view, the view that historical time is established with religious time as its fundamental subject” (“UCR”, I, 14). What he means by this is the fact that only with Formless Self, or Self without form, as its basis and fundamental subject historical time is established. In my own language, this means that insofar as one views that the intrinsic value of human nature (i.e., Formless Self) is “livable” here at the present moment as a pragmatic value, one can transcend history while never isolated from it. Hisamatsu’s notion of the length-dimension
thus comes to mean a Supra-historical formation of history.

2. Hisamatsu’s Zen Atheism and Hartshorne’s Neo-classical Theism

When Hisamatsu, from the above perspective, criticizes heteronomous or theonomous view of time for never coinciding with historical time, isolated and being an escape from the actualities of life, his critique is directed toward Pure Land Buddhism and Christian theism alike. But is his critique truly adequate? Another of our authors, Charles Hartshorne, would say no, although he, too, criticizes traditional theism insofar as it includes in itself no element(s) of naturalism.

As has already been seen, Hartshorne finds an intrinsic value in any and every actuality, including humanity. Therefore, for him the idea of the God of traditional supernaturalism is questionable because it is antagonistic or destructive to that value in creation. Yet, he differs also from traditional naturalism, especially pantheism, which amounts to the view that “deity is the all of relative or interdependent items, with nothing wholly independent or in any clear sense nonrelative.” Thus he takes the neo-classical stance, “panentheism”; it is the view that deity is in some real aspect “distinguishable from and independent of any and all relative items, and yet, taken as an actual whole, includes all relative items” (ibid.). From this standpoint, Hisamatsu’s naturalistic atheism is a dubious attempt.

However, Hisamatsu’s Zen atheism is not the kind of atheism which Hartshorne designates in these terms: “There is no being in any respect absolutely perfect; all beings are in all respects surpassable by something conceivable, perhaps by others or perhaps by themselves in another state.” Rather, it is, like H. N. Wieman’s idea of God as the “creative event,” indicative of the producer, or the production or emergence, or the manner of production or emergence of “unexpected, unpredictable good.” Hisamatsu’s Zen philosophy of “Formless Self” or Ganz-Selbst would not even contradict the positivist William R.
Dennes’ agreement with John Dewey as regards theism, which Hartshorne, too, affirms, that the term “God” cannot be given meaning save as designating “some experienceable processes”—such as the ‘multitude of facts and forces which we brought together simply with respect to their coincidence in producing one undesigned effect—the furtherance of good in human life’” (PSG, 491). What I am intending to say by this is that Hisamatsu’s atheism is a religious atheism.

However, one of the major differences between Hartshorne and Hisamatsu lies in the fact that Hartshorne perceives the emergence of value as due to man’s co-working with God rather than as literally God’s working or man’s working (PSG, 396), whereas Hisamatsu conceives of it as preeminent Formless Self’s working. Here is the reason for the former to be a naturalistic theist and for the latter to be a religious atheist. But both of them deny traditional supernaturalistic theism and break through humanistic naturalism or modern autonomous humanism.

We have been surveying in this sub-section Hisamatsu’s Zen atheistic vision of human nature in its intrinsic, intended instrumental, and pragmatic values. For the purpose of elucidating accurately the contents of his thought we adopted a comparative method, namely, the comparative articulation of his Zen atheism by contrast with Hartshorne’s neo-classical theism or panentheism.

Thus far it has turned out that his thought is quite congenial to Hartshorne’s except for the last point of comparison, i.e., the pragmatic value of human nature. Both of them affirm the co-constitution of human nature by intrinsic and intended instrumental values. Neither of them is thematically concerned with the ultimate religious “source” (arché) of the intended instrumental value of human nature or Goodness: Hisamatsu in principle denies it and Hartshorne argues that it is the abstract nature of God included in the concrete nature of God or the total God here-now. By contrast, the unique significance of that source, in my view, is thematically clarified by Whitehead’s
doctrine of the "primordial nature of God" and by Katsumi Takizawa's philosophy of the "Proto-factum Immanuel" (i.e., the Logos).

At any rate, it is now to be recognized that both Hisamatsu and Hartshorne attempt to solve the problem of how self-benefit and benefiting others are compatible in redemption—the problem with which we started this section—in terms of their respective dealings with the synthesis of intrinsic and intended instrumental values in human nature. Since Hisamatsu sees that the intrinsic value of human nature is nothing other than the presence here—now of Formless Self necessarily resulting in compassion, his solution of the synthesis is dependent upon the intrinsic value. This is commensurate with his assertion of a-theism. By contrast, although Hartshorne, too, emphasizes the primary importance of the intrinsic value in human nature (and in creation in general), he takes neo-classical theistic position as regards the solution of the synthesis: Namely, for him the intrinsic and intended instrumental values of human nature are both included in the total, concrete deity who absorbs and appropriates both of these.  

Their different solutions to the synthesis of the two values are particularly evident in their respective discussions of the pragmatic value of human nature inasmuch as this value can only occur in response to the synthetic actuality of the other two values. The pragmatic value of human nature is the practical and responsible affirmation of this synthesis. Now, as we have shown previously, Hisamatsu's view of the pragmatic value satisfies its "livable" aspect, commensurate with his solution to the synthesis of the intrinsic and intended instrumental values. What about Hartshorne's case, then? He satisfies, it seems to me, not only the "livable" aspect but also the "rationally defensible" aspect of the pragmatic value, commensurate with his doctrine of panentheism. This has to be shown, however, in the next section.
III. Hartshorne’s Theory of Human Nature

The method of study which we adopt in this work is that of comparative articulation. If we want to know some thinker’s system of thought in its uniqueness, we can study it both intensively and extensively—that is, from within and by comparison with some other system(s) of thought. An intensive study can be lured and promoted by an extensive study, but not necessarily vice versa. A quite detailed, elaborate study of a thought, although there is no denying that it is important and necessary, sometimes fails to refer extensively to other thought(s) of a similar kind. Thus it ends up with a parochial and self-righteous attempt; it tends to lack, I might say, friendship of scholarship. Accordingly, the method of comparative articulation might be an appropriate method of studying thoughts especially in a pluralistic world in which we find ourselves today.

In the preceding section, we studied some of the major traits of Hisamatsu’s Zen atheism as regards human nature in its intrinsic, intended instrumental, and pragmatic values. We applied the method of comparative articulation to the study of Hisamatsu’s thought; that is, we articulated his Zen anthropology, if necessary, by comparison with Hartshorne’s thought concerning the subject matter in question, the threefold value system of humanity. For the study of Hisamatsu’s Zen anthropology our use of Hartshorne’s thought was subsidiary; the former was focal in Section II. Now, in this section, the method is the reverse: clarification of Hartshorne’s theory of human nature is focal and Hisamatsu’s thought subsidiary or instrumental. Since we already discussed in the preceding section the intrinsic and intended instrumental values to a considerable extent in the manner of articulating the similarities between our two authors, we do not want to repeat the same discussion in this section. We rather want to explore the difference between them as regards especially the pragmatic value of human nature, the
third point we discussed in the preceding section.

A. Human Nature in Its Pragmatic Value

Hartshorne recognizes, as does Hisamatsu, a twofold task of present-day philosophy of religion (neo-classical theism, in his terms): the break-through of traditional supernaturalistic theism (heteronomous theonomy of the medieval type, in Hisamatsu’s case) and of humanistic naturalism (humanistic autonomy, in Hisamatsu’s case). Both of them are keenly aware of the postmodern responsibility of philosophy of religion. For both of them not only medieval ages but also modern times have totally relinquished their own validity for the capacity of creating adequate metaphysics, a metaphysics which includes in itself philosophical cosmology and religious thinking in a synthetic manner. Hence, they have both been endeavoring vigorously until today to promote their respective philosophical movements, process philosophy and F.A.S. (i.e., Formless Self/All Mankind/Super-historical History). (Hisamatsu, however, passed away at the age of 90 in 1980; Hartshorne is still active in his late 90’s.)

It is conspicuous that their respective philosophical careers, owing their impetus to the thoughts of their respective mentors, Kitaro Nishida and Alfred North Whitehead, finally culminate in the emphasis upon the radical humanization of metaphysics and thus upon the importance of the pragmatic value of human nature, Praxis. As mentioned before, Hartshorne accounts for the “rationally defensible” aspect as well as for the “livable” aspect—the one Hisamatsu articulates in a peculiarly Zen philosophic manner—of the pragmatic value of human nature. But how?

1. The Rationally Defensible Aspect of the Pragmatic Value

Hartshorne shares with Hisamatsu a view of the pragmatic value of human nature as “livable.” In his case, this view is related to the influence of Peirce’s and James’ pragmatism upon his thought; in him American pragmatism and Whiteheadian process thought are unified magnificently. For instance, he
holds the opinion concerning meaning, belief, and action to this effect: "Ideas are significant only if they can or could be believed" (CSPM, 80). Further, he states that "there is no adequate test of the genuineness of belief other than this: can (and in suitable circumstances would) the belief be acted upon or in some sense lived by?" (ibid.).

This element of pragmatism in his thought Hartshorne calls "a kind of existentialism" (CSPM, xvi). For him ideas must be expressible in living and behavior or they are merely verbal. In line with Peirce, James, and Dewey Hartshorne affirms that "belief can be livable without being true" (CSPM, 80). Belief, in this case, implies one concerning the truth of life.

Thus far Hartshorne seems to be considerably in line with the Zen existentialism of Hisamatsu; for Hisamatsu, since this phenomenal existence ("my life") is nothing other than the expression of the true, Formless Self, it is itself what Lin-chi calls the "Independent Man of bodhi" or the "True-man"; the true Self should be livable at present in the world of samsara as this human Self ("Zen", 27). Thus Hartshorne's words, "...if they [beliefs] are in no sense livable then they cannot be true, for they have no definite meaning" (CSPM, 80), would fit in, in this particular connection, with Hisamatsu's claim that one of the most basic Zen expressions, "Not relying on words," is to be taken to mean "prior to words," in the sense of not depending on the sutra expressions but of immediately actualizing here-now Buddha-Nature or "one's Original-Face" ("Zen", 23-4).

Yet, Hartshorne differs from Hisamatsu in that he grasps the livable aspect of pragmatic value only within the dipolarity of this aspect and the rationally defensible aspect, which Hisamatsu, however, rather neglects characteristically, as has been critically pointed out by Katsumi Takizawa. Takizawa's criticism was concerned with Hisamatsu's view of a continuity-in-discontinuity between the "samsara-like" (Jpn., shojiteki) or inauthentic self
and the "nirvana-like" (Jpn., metsudoteki) or Authentic or Formless Self as not really distinguishing between a primary continuity (i.e., the absolute fact of unity-in-distinction in the depths of every human existence of the eternal, universal Buddhahood and the spacio-temporal sentient beings) and a secondary continuity (i.e., the emergence of a true man as the enlightened) that can arise only based upon the primary one. The problem is whether one really recognizes rationally what one has already been experiencing as livable in one's own life.

Now, according to Hartshorne, the problem of metaphysics is to find or create a view of first principles that covers both aspects, livable and rationally defensible (CSPM, xvi). In view of this important rational character of Hartshorne's metaphysics let me articulate his thought in comparison with some other American philosophers, such as William James, Charles S. Peirce, and John Dewey, in what follows. Here our East-West inter-religious comparative articulation of Hartshorne's thought with Hisamatsu's as its major dialogue partner necessarily gives rise to a new, intra-Western discussion of the pragmatic value of human nature. This is important and understandable even for us Easterners because it has turned out that the problem of metaphysical axiology cannot be exhausted by our comparative studies of Hartshorne's and Hisamatsu's views of human nature in its intrinsic, intended instrumental, and pragmatic values. However, as shall be shown, this intra-Western discussion finally enriches our East-West inter-religious comparative articulation, paradoxically enough.

For Hartshorne the pragmatic value of human nature, which must be livable at the present moment, must at the same time be experimentally verified in the future. In this sense Hartshorne's neo-classical metaphysics is basically in accord with William James' pragmatism, the insistence that true ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify—that is, those that become instruments, not answers to enigmas upon which we can lie back. However, Hartshorne
goes deeper than James in his understanding of verifiability or instrumentality of ideas about the universe, including especially human nature. He tries to explicate the full meaning of Whitehead's dictum, which he esteems (see CSMP, xvi), that "rationalism is the search for the coherence of the presuppositions of civilized living." We can say, in this regard, that Hartshorne shares Charles Sanders Peirce's pragmaticism, though with a new emphasis upon its theistic application or amplification, i.e., the thesis that

does not [like James' pragmatism] make the sumnum bonum to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody these generals which were just now said to be destined, which is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable.²⁶

Hartshorne adds a new theistic meaning to Peirce's pragmaticism of this kind by applying his pragmaticistic categories, though Peirce largely refused to do so, to God (CSPM, xvi). This is because he believes the pragmatic value of human nature is rationally defensible only and finally in terms of neo-classical theism. In short, Peirce raised the question of the source of pragmatic value by coining the term "pragmaticism" in opposition to James' popularization of his thought as "pragmatism." Hartshorne attempts to solve this question through and through theistically.

2. Continuity Let us then examine Hartshorne's solution to the question of the source of the pragmatic value of human nature in his conception of "continuity"; his critique of John Dewey's pragmatism provides a useful case in this matter. Hartshorne is fully aware of the fact that continuity is one of the "subtlest" problems which event pluralism like pragmatism must face, because people are prone to regard the apparent continuity of process as its "lack of distinct units" (CSPM,
Dewey, Bergson, Peirce, all three careful thinkers much interested in the analysis of experience as such, he critically assumes, found no definite discreteness in the becoming of human experience (CSPM, 192).

Dewey, for instance, regards the life of humanity as continuous in such a sense that "what one person and one group accomplish becomes the standing ground and starting point of those who succeed them." Such a continuous nature of human experience, in Dewey's view, is consistent with a natural scientific truth called "a chain of cause and effects" in what happens with inanimate things. "To live signifies," says Dewey, "that a connected continuity of acts is effected in which preceding ones prepare the conditions under which later ones occur."

For Dewey, therefore, the continuity of the life process is solely ensured by human acts themselves, not by anything beyond them. His hatred of traditional supernaturalism proceeds from here. It is a pity for him that something in human nature, if exposed to danger, breeds an overpowering love of security, love for certainty, translated into a desire not to be disturbed and unsettled, thus leading to "dogmatism, to intolerance and fanaticism on one side and sloth on the other" (QC, 228). That something he regards as the isolation of the human self, or the isolated self, from "continuity with the natural world" (QC, 23). The isolated self, magnifying itself as traditional supernaturalism, is by nature hostile to what occurs in experimental inquiry, that is, to what is actively continuous in human nature with the nature outside, including the self's past experiences (QC, 229).

This view of continuity by Dewey is in a sense naive from the Hartshornean perspective because it fails to distinguish, in what is actively continuous in human nature, between the discrete and the continuous. If acts of becoming are, as Hartshorne insists with Whitehead, atomic and discrete, they cannot be continuous by themselves with the nature outside. There must be something else enabling them to be so. What is that, then?
Dewey can never answer this question.

Hartshorne, on the contrary, finds an answer to the question in the fact that the "incoming officer of an organization and previous officers both represent the same on-going society" (CSPM, 198). By society Hartshorne means what Whitehead terms an "enduring individual." Then, he writes:

Each such self inherits purposes from its predecessors, and the more it can accept and execute these purposes, the richer and more harmonious will be its own content. But more than that. In my view a rational self, no matter how momentary, cannot be satisfied with less than a rational aim, and no aim short of some universal long-run good is fully rational. (CSPM, 198)

It is noteworthy in this passage that Hartshorne is concerned with purposes or aims but not acts, like Dewey, in accounting for the problem of continuity. The passage speaks of two stages: the stage of appropriating purposes from the past and the stage of aiming at some universal long-run good. The former stage, in my view, is inclusive of Dewey's insistence upon a "chain of cause and effects"; in this sense Hartshorne, too, affirms that each momentary actuality necessarily inherits causally from its past, and that this inheritance necessitates that a certain class of possible successors to that past should not remain empty (that is, they are in a "cumulative" process) (CSPM, 202). However, the real problem of continuity does not lie herein. Rather, it lies in the latter stage, which Hartshorne explicates as follows:

...each new concrete self faces the task, not merely of prolonging a chain of causal necessities, or of continuing to express an antecedent character which, with circumstances, uniquely determines concrete actions, but of freely creating a slightly new character, and thus establishing a new set
of causal possibilities and probabilities. (CSPM, 202)

The real problem of continuity should, then, be explored with a question like this: How can we discern continuity with respect to free actions? Put in another way: What guarantees the continuity of one’s free actions when and in that they are spontaneous and independent of the nature outside, including one’s own past experiences?

This really is a difficult problem. For we would easily confuse a quasi-solution to it with a real one. As Hartshorne clearly discerns, no process directly exhibited in human experiences seems to come in clearly discrete units (CSPM, 192); that is, a real discreteness is only vaguely or approximately given (CSPM, 192). As a result, we would assume that this vague presence of discreetness in human experiences is identical with continuity. Therefore, we need to have, in this matter, a metaphysical, rather than merely empirical, intuition, like the one that Hartshorne shows when he says: “...continuity belongs with the abstract, indefinite, possible, infinite, not with the concrete, definite, actual, finite.” This metaphysical truth, in his view, was missed by Bergson, Peirce, and Dewey, but seen by James and Whitehead (anticipated by Buddhists and some Islamic thinkers) (CSPM, 195).

Viewed from the perspective of this metaphysical truth, the problem of continuity is necessarily to be conceptually reversed: one need not be worried to ensure the continuity of one’s experience by one’s own acts but rather find oneself, to one’s great surprise and inmost joy, in what Hartshorne calls the “immanence of God.” Now it is possible, one comes to realize, to interpret the afore-mentioned two stages of human experience from a new perspective as when Hartshorne states: “The universality of order, and of creative freedom from order, are two expressions of the immanence of God whose attributes are the supreme values of the cosmic variables” (BH, 164).

Then, what is the metaphysical character of this immanent
God? Hartshorne replies: This God is “nature, envisaged as rationally and concretely as man can envisage her” (BH, 163) and is “the unitary drives...by virtue of which the world is itself a living individual—in this case a deathless (though not an unchanging!) one” (BH, 163). That is, this immanent God is a supremely “enduring individual” or a maximal embodiment of “on-going society,” who alone can guarantee the continuity of human nature/experience in the midst of free actions by any of us. Thus the factor of creative action, real possibility, and open future, for Hartshorne, is the expression of the immanence of God as “a supreme creativity in the world” (BH, 162). It is, therefore, only from the perspective of the immanence of God that Hartshorne wants to rationally defend the pragmatic value of human nature as it appears in human actions but is continuously related to the nature outside. What now appears to be pivotal is the notion of “enduring individual” or “on-going society” as it is deified by virtue of the immanence of God; the continuity of human nature through time is only guaranteed by that immanence.

It is to be noted at this juncture that a similar case of deification of the notion of “individual” can be seen in Hisamatsu. Similar to Hartshorne, he regards the problem of continuity of human nature in the midst of time of actions as the immanent expression of Something Divine. But in his case this Something Divine does not mean God but the metaphysical ultimate, the Formless Self. His way of explaining the problem of continuity is as follows:

The self of life-death nature [i.e., human nature] breaking up and becoming the Self without life-and-death means that the self of life-death nature becomes awakened to its original Self. In this sense the Self without life-and-death has continuity with the self of life-death nature. ("UCR", I, 28; italics mine)

The deification procedure (or, more accurately, identification)
observable in the above is by virtue of the metaphysical Self, the Formless Self. It is therefore a non-theistic or a-theistic deification. For Hisamatsu, it necessarily involves a leap and thus is not a flat identity. "The self in ultimate antinomy [of life-and-death] cannot become the True Self with continuity. Only when the self which is ultimately antinomic breaks up, does the Self of Oneness awake to itself" (ibid.). This solution to the problem of continuity of human nature, to my mind, is mainly explicative of the intrinsic value of human nature as effected, that is, the livable aspect of the pragmatic value of human nature; it does not, as Hartshorne's notion of the immanence of God does, account for the rationally defensible aspect of the pragmatic value.

This divergence between the two authors is striking, resulting from their respective metaphysical orientations, Hisamatsu's Zen atheism and Hartshorne's neo-classical theism. It will be discussed more fully later on (in Sub-section B). Here suffice it to say that the divergence is of crucial significance in the matter of the inter-cultural dialogue between Buddhism and Christianity with specific focus upon human nature. Our specific task in this sub-section now is to articulate further Hartshorne's notion of the immanence of God as it relates itself to two more subject-matters, quality of feeling and ethical decision.

3. Quality of Feeling As has been elucidated so far, what is metaphysically continuous is not act but on-going society constitutive of human nature and this society is absorbed into and is deified by the immanence of God. Then what is the distinctive character of the metaphysically continuous in human nature/experience? The answer Hartshorne gives to this question is: quality of feeling.

Hartshorne criticizes several commentators (including Dewey) of the great panpsychist theoretician of "feeling-quality," Charles Sanders Peirce. Hartshorne says they have tried to purify Peirce's theory of feeling-quality from its psychic aspects (by distinguishing between its "monadic" property and the
special case when this quality is a quality of feeling), only to ruin Peirce’s first category altogether (BH, 185). First, what explains the existence of red or blue, in their view, is bare oneness, whereas the whole point of Peirce’s endeavor, Hartshorne stresses, was to show “how such feelings are the basis of logical unity, not the reverse” (BH, 185). Second, these commentators, in Hartshorne’s view, are contradicting Peirce’s category of universal “thirdness” or continuity as the essence of the universal (BH, 185). Hartshorne affirms, with Peirce, that quality, as a universal, can only be a continuum.

In his theory of categories Peirce-affirms that experience has the three basic aspects of feeling—quality, reaction or conflict, and meaning. With respect to those three categories Hartshorne holds that, since existence (or experience) is an integration of the three categories, it is feeling that has the more adequate connotations (BH, 185). Here lies, Hartshorne assumes, one reason for Peirce’s being a panpsychist. Furthermore, there seems to be a distinction between quality and feeling. This, in Hartshorne’s view, is due to the fact that “feeling” suggests the integration of the monadic category with the other two categories of reaction and meaning, whereas “quality” abstracts sharply from all relations (BH, 186).

Seen from Hartshornes’s panpsychic view, the word “quality” refers to “whatever is continuous with (through whatever range of intermediaries) such sensory or effective predicates as red or sweet or painful or the feeling—quality of a human consciousness as a whole” (BH, 186). A qualitative genus (like color) is a larger section of the continuum, a species (like red) a smaller slice of it. In any case, it is important for us to note here that Hartshorne, primarily based upon his notion of “continuum,” intends to deal with “the panpsychic extension of feeling to all things in so far as they are qualitative” (BH, 1186). Panpsychism is the metaphysical solution to the problem of continuity for Hartshorne. He has learned it from Peirce.
It is to be noted, however, that panpsychism in its Hartshornean version is distinct from and goes further than the Peircean original in that it necessarily undergoes a conceptual reversion by virtue of the immanence of God. This time the immanence is termed the "feeling of feeling." By the feeling of feeling "God feels wicked feelings not as his own feelings but as his creatures" (CSPM, 241). As Hartshorne elaborates, the first feeling is the "subjective form" of the experience, the second the "objective form." That is, both are feelings but the second is the original (and temporally prior), the first is a participation in the second after the fact. What is conspicuous in Hartshorne's theistic panpsychism is, then, that he distinguishes between the creaturely fact that wickedness is in wrong decisions and the divine fact that "God inherits our decisions, as ours, not as his" (CSPM, 241).

4. Ethical Decision Hartshorne's solution to the problem of evil as in the above is, I admire, superb. This superbness implies, however, more than "feeling of feeling." I would say that it implies "feeling of feeling" plus goodness. In my view, Hartshorne connects panpsychism with the idea of goodness, especially of the divine goodness, namely, with neo-classical theism. But how? We can elucidate this in scrutinizing his critique of Dewey's view of ethical decision.

For Dewey, as Hartshorne clearly perceives, the basis of ethical decision is the total, unique, concrete situation, not some abstract rule (DR, 125). He is antagonistic to traditional religion's emphasis upon salvation of the personal soul and also to the utilitarian insistence upon private pleasure as the motive for action. He instead finds "the real object of all intelligent conducts" in the idea that the stable and expanding institutions of all things make life worth while throughout all human relationships (QC, 31). He seeks the motive for action apart from Being which is universal, fixed, and immutable (QC, 7)—and this in view of the inherent uncertainty characteristic of practical activity (QC, 6).
Hartshorne, however, criticizes Dewey's position for failing to take into account the fact that "man does not see the concrete situation, except with enormous and more or less willfully selected blind spots" (DR, 125). The implication of this critique of Dewey is, I would assume, metaphysical cum theistic. I mean that Hartshorne is keenly aware of the impeding factor of human actions inherent in human nature, evil. This factor we can solve or break through only by the metaphysical cum theistic means. To be sure, Dewey is right in that he hates traditionalists' hypocrisy of pretending to be devoted to intellectual certainty for its own sake although actually they want it to safeguard what they desire and esteem (QC, 39). But he is mistaken in assuming that traditionalists' engagement in metaphysics or theism necessarily leads to hypocrisy. For their hypocrisy is caused not because of metaphysics but because of their failure in metaphysics or theism. What is needed is, therefore, an authentic metaphysics–cum–theism, not its denial. This view is commensurate with Hartshorne's following dictum:

There is no reason or motive for pursuing the good but the good itself. To know the end is to have all the motives there can be for seeking to actualize it. If, then, God is adequately aware of all actuality as actual and all possibility as possible, he has adequate motivation for seeking to actualize maximal possibilities of future value. There can be no ethical appeal beyond the decision of the one who in his decision takes account of all actuality and possibility. (DR, 124-5)

This really is a metaphysical cum theistic explication of the rationally defensible aspect of the pragmatic value of human nature. The conceptual reversion of human experience by virtue of the immanence of God is here effected with specific focus upon the notion of the good. As a result, Hartshorne is able to envision a moral principle that one needs the help of rules,
adopted in moments of calm and disinterested reflection, to protect oneself and others against the bias of one's perceptions and inferences. This principle is in direct opposition to Dewey's ethical activism with no metaphysical or theistic undergirding and is guaranteed by a deeper principle that God needs nothing but his perceptive grasp of the actual and potential experiences and interests, and the power of reaching a decision, any decision, taking account of what he perceives (DR, 125). This latter principle means nothing other than a metaphysical-cum-theistic definition of "goodness," namely, the divine goodness.

B. Theism Versus Humanism

As we have shown in the preceding sub-section, the notion of the immanence of God is pivotal in Hartshorne's explication of the rationally defensible aspect of the pragmatic value of human nature. This notion alone can guarantee metaphysically cum theistically our human endeavor of corroborating the truth of civilized actions. It alone enables the intended instrumental value in our actions truly instrumental to the future experiences, not necessarily of our own. If God is willing to be influenced by our actions, our actions will never fail to be instrumental to the future. Even evil in our actions will be absorbed by deity, but only because it is redemptively transformed.

This vision, however, cannot be accepted at least by two groups of people, traditional supernaturalists and humanistic naturalists. The former group of people negate the immanent nature of God, the latter the traditional notion of God itself. It is to be noted here, however, that humanistic naturalists, such as Dewey, negate traditional supernaturalism, just like Hartshorne does. Is there, then, any point of contact between Dewey's humanistic naturalism and Hartshorne's neo-classical theism? What precisely is the place where they divert from each other?

Dewey's humanistic naturalism is a standpoint to consider the creative process as a "natural process," in the sense that it endures and advances with the life of humanity to the extent
that it can be “both accelerated and purified through elimination of that irrelevant element that culminates in the idea of the supernatural” (CF, 50). As a radical anti-supernaturalist, Dewey accordingly discloses his humanistic hope of keeping the vital factors within the limit of the natural so as to gain an incalculable reinforcement. This hope is inseparably connected with his re-definition of “God” as “an active relation between ideal and actual.” He differentiates “the religious” from religions (See Chapter 1, “Religion Versus the Religious,” of A Common Faith). As Harthshorne carefully acknowledges, Dewey’s humanistic naturalism is not, mysteriously, atheistic.

This is internally related to Dewey’s view of the “possibility of Praxis” (i.e., the total ontological basis of Praxis, or of the pragmatic value of human nature with both its livable and rationally defensible aspects) and of the “relationship between God and nature” (i.e., the problem of theological cosmology). Harthshorne, however, repudiates Dewey’s view from his perspective of neo-classical theism. In what sense or to what extent is Harthshorne right in his regard? This is, then, our question to be pursued in this final sub-section.

Significantly enough, Harthshorne’s repudiation of Dewey’s humanistic naturalism includes in itself a repudiation of traditional supernaturalism, a collaboration with him. This is important for the over-all intention of our study, “Hartshorne and Hisamatsu on Human Nature.” For Hisamatsu, too, repudiates modern humanism as well as traditional theism. By scrutinizing Harthshorne’s critique of Dewey we finally would like, therefore, to deliver a conceptual equipment for the comparison of Hartshorne’s and Hisamatsu’s metaphysics as regards the possibility of praxis and the relationship between God (or Buddha) and nature.

1. The Possibility of Praxis In Chapter Three of his Beyond Humanism, “Dewey’s Philosophy of Religion,” Hartshorne is concerned with the paradoxical character of religious consciousness, i.e., the tension which it involves between the finite and the infinite. For him it is a pity that there is a natural tendency
for human beings to seek to escape from religion of this sort. People’s escape from religion happens in the manner like this:

They do this in two opposite ways: by trying to escape from their human sense of finitude through mystical illusion of absolute oneness with God, or by trying to obliterate their no less human consciousness of the infinite. (BH, 39)

The first is the standpoint of traditional theology, while the second, in Hartshorne’s view, is best represented by Dewey’s *A Common Faith*.

Hartshorne, however, accepts Dewey’s critique of atheism to the effect that atheism, like traditional theology, is lacking in appreciation of the fact that without nature we could do nothing. He is also appreciative of what Dewey calls “natural piety,” the piety the atheist lacks. But for Hartshorne natural piety is significant only insofar as it means pansychism. For, then, “there is a fairly obvious reason for suspecting that it also means a kind of theism, though not the kind Dewey is explicitly opposing” (BH, 41). From this point of view, Hartshorne even characterizes Dewey’s view of natural piety as the position in which “Crudely, God is simply nature as serviceable to man” (BH, 39).

Hartshorne’s critique of Dewey’s humanistic naturalism then moves on to the problem of how to evaluate the newer tendencies in science as favorable to its recognition of the “naturalness” of purposive action. Both of them affirm these tendencies. Dewey rightly observes (and Hartshorne agrees) that as long as the Newtonian science, with its dogmatic assertion that purposes have no real part in natural process, at least below the human level, was firmly held, a dichotomy between human and non-human nature favored super-naturalism. However, the God of supernaturalism as an actual individual endowed with perfection is, for Dewey (and also for Hartshorne),
simply the vicious identification of the possible and the actual. For above the actualities of nature there are the “unrealized but realizable possibilities of nature” calling for ethical adventure by men and women. Then Dewey contends (and Hartshorne merely partially agrees) that “Moral and religious faith are not so much in what is, as in what, through our action, might be” (BH, 41), and that “To destroy this ‘might be’ character of the ideal is to cut the nerve of action” (BH, 41).

Hartshorne explains the reason why he does not fully agree with Dewey’s thesis of the “might be” character of the ideal in human praxis:

Dewey is a shrewd critic of the human lust for absolute knowledge. But the “quest for certainty,” as the cowardly search for a life without risk, is one thing; while the quest for assurance that there is a minimal significance to the brave facing of risk—and all life when well lived—is another thing. The one is cowardice or madness, as you choose. The other is merely rationality, the intelligent understanding of the implications of courage. (BH, 44)

That is to say, Hartshorne fundamentally affirms as “what is” the “world-embracing love of God” (BH, 44), and for him this “what is” can alone guarantee the “intelligent understanding of the implications of courage.”

In my opinion, however, Hartshorne’s repudiation of Dewey in the above is one-sided. To be sure, he is right in articulating the importance of the rationally defensible aspect of the pragmatic value of human nature as commensurate with the “might be” character of the ideal—and this in terms of a theistic quest for assurance as the intelligent understanding of the implications of courage. But this does not mean that he has fully articulated the meaning of courage as it occurs here-now when one plunges into the “might be” character of the ideal in human nature. In other words, he does not account for the
livable aspect of the pragmatic value of human nature or Praxis as regards its living source.

It is precisely at this conjuncture, I assume, that Hisamatsu as a Zen atheist asserts that going toward what is beyond humanity does not mean leaving humanity for God or leaving here for the beyond but “transforming here while not leaving here” (“M”, 74). For him it is in this sense that Nirvana is Samsara. To be noteworthy, he in this regard calls into question the theistic view that only with respect to God the movement “from beyond down to here” is valid and contends that the same movement (e.g., agape or compassion) is discernible in humanity, too. This is because it is intrinsic to every human being to be and to become a Buddha (“M”, 76). To be a Buddha constitutes the intrinsic value of human nature and to become a Buddha the pragmatic value. The latter value is a courageous realization of the former value by any of us. Since the intrinsic value is that of each one of us, realization of this value, i.e., the pragmatic value, necessarily takes the form of a self-realization. The intrinsic value of human nature as Formless Self is the living source of the pragmatic value, Praxis, especially of its livable aspect.

Hartshorne’s quest for assurance as the intelligent understanding of the implications of courage in terms of the immanence of God, of course, includes in itself the intention or consequence of the livable aspect of the pragmatic value. Therefore, he admits himself to be a pragmaticist or existentialist. Yet, his over-all philosophic stance is that of a rationalistic defender of the pragmatic value, as when he states: “Human choice may then make a difference to God as the action of a man’s cells make a difference to the man” (BH, 42). This famous doctrine of organic-social analogy by Hartshorne is of temporalistic modality, in the sense that God’s future enjoyment will be partially contingent upon our actions (BH, 42). Within this context, intelligence in action (i.e., the very thing in the pragmatic value that is to be rationally defended) is essentially
“the power to generalize beyond the mere finite (as, for example, in mathematics), so that it can hardly make a satisfactory religion to conceive of human ideals as referring to a merely finite future” (BH, 43).

From this perspective, Hartshorne raises such questions to Dewey as follows: How can a universe devoid as a whole of consciousness or significance be “carried forward” by the consciousness of some of its parts? How, being as a whole without value, can it gain value from the parts? And how can the universe, as it is not a volitional being, “do” anything in the sense here relevant? (BH, 45) As is clear in these questions, the core of his organic–social analogy lies, therefore, in the fact that “our satisfaction can form part of a cosmic good that is lasting” (BH, 45). Not as a mere means to our life, he goes further to say, is the divine life to be thought of, but as a superior life to which we can also be “in the relation of means” (BH, 45–6). Conversely, this means that we are now completely understood by someone who is an all–understanding being, being everlastingly actual.

Hartshorne’s understanding of the possibility of Praxis, vis–à–vis that of Dewey’s as thus explicated, is best elaborately concluded in the following:

Dewey is greatly, and justifiably, concerned about the failure of traditional religion to enter whole–heartedly upon the task of social amelioration. He believes that super–naturalism turns attention away from the “values that inhere in the actual connections of human being with one another” or from “the sweep and depth of the implications of natural human relation.” (BH, 50)

To hold that this ideal is based upon the actuality of a perfect understanding is not at all to fall into the error, so properly condemned by Dewey, of destroying the meaning of the ideal as that which we might accomplish.
For here is one ideal that could never correspond to actuality—unless there exists a God. (BH, 47)

Thus Hartshorne can reject, *with Dewey*, such theism as would divorce God from nature, spirituality from materiality, working havoc with orthodox ethics (BH, 50). Hartshorne’s neo-classical theism is appreciative of whatever is positively significant in Dewey’s naturalistic humanism. If so, we contend, it has to include in itself Hisamatsu’s Zen atheistic explication of the livable aspect of the pragmatic value of human nature. Otherwise, it seems to us, it would lose the object of its rational defense, the aspect that the rationally defensible aspect of the pragmatic value presupposes.

2. *God or Nature* What I have elucidated in the above in reference to Hartshorne’s understanding of the possibility of praxis, has, *mutatis mutandis*, some correlation to what Hartshrone says about the beauty of the creatures:

The value of the world does not reside merely in there being a single perfect understanding of the individuals in that world, but also in the aesthetic richness arising from the variety and intensity of the experiences of those individuals. (BH, 47)

This passage is significant in that it shows a theistic inclusion of the intrinsic value of nature. It is in line with this that Hartshorne accounts for the phrase *deus sive natura* following Spinoza. He further states: “God, I hold, is an artist fostering and loving the beauty of the creatures, the harmonies and intensities of their experiences, as data for his own” (CSPM, 309). Thus the heart of Christendom, which Hartshorne sees as *deus est caritas*, as taught by Jesus, is consistently brought together with the intellect of Spinoza. Hartshorne thinks it his fortune that he no longer has to choose between Spinoza and Jesus. For the reasons which prevented Spinoza from regarding
nature not only as God but as the God of love, in his view, can be proved as erroneous in the light of the new science and the new logic. Whitehead's philosophy as uniquely elucidated by him as "panentheism."

Hartshorne’s doctrine of panentheism consists of two elements: (1) every individual in nature is in some degree akin to the human being either as inferior or as superior; (2) nature as a whole, as the inclusive individual, can only be conceived as superior, and this in maximal sense (BH, 50). Thus panentheism means that God is both the system of dependent things or effects (i.e., (1); cf. Spinoza’s "natura naturata") and something independent of it (i.e., (2); cf. Spinoza’s "natura naturans") (DR, 90). It is distinct from traditional pantheism, the view that God is merely the cosmos, in all aspects inseparable from the system (e.g., Spinoza’s "natura naturans" as God as substance and free cause necessitating "natura naturata" as the modes of the attributes of God contained in Himself); it distinguishes itself also from traditional theism, the belief that God is not the system, but is in all aspects independent (e.g., Thomas’ notion of God as ipsum esse subsistens) (cf. DR, 90).

From this perspective of panentheism, it turns out that Dewey, on the one hand, is confusedly antagonistic to theism because of what in reality is a "radical corruption" of theism (BH, 50). On the other, he fails to see the danger that "something which participated in the partiality of my ego is held—without full recognition of the fact—to be the only standard by which that partiality may be judged" (BH, 53). Fleeing the divine tyranny, humanism may only be appalled by other tyrannies which take its place, i.e., a philosophical system and the group tyranny. But all the evils, including the group tyranny, contained in (albeit neither intended nor caused by) the cosmic reality, are, in Hartshorne’s view, “in spite of this (cosmic) meaning, not because of it” (CSPM, 317).

Because of his narrow-mindedness or lack of adequate understanding of new theism, Dewey, as Hartshorne critically
assumes, has "no eager delight and no burning passion to penetrate her [nature's] secrets" (BH, 56)—and this with all his mild sense of her grandeur and fascination. For Dewey, nature as a whole need not be supposed conscious; he has sought to lead people from supernaturalism to a "not too egregiously atheistic naturalism" (BH, 56). It is, however, Hartshorne's humorous appreciation of Dewey to state concerning a subtle, rather paradoxical, relationship of process philosophy to American pragmatism as follows: "It is possible that, somewhat indirectly at least, he may prove a principal creator of what may appear theistic naturalism" (BH, 56).

Conclusions:

I know no better conclusion of our discussion in Section III than Hartshorne's elaborate critique of both Dewey and supernaturalism in these words:

Dewey and traditionalists agree in giving pantheism short shrift. Either God alone or nature alone appears to be the choice. Again, there is a third position: we may agree with Dewey that there be no extra-natural being, and yet hold that there must be in nature a being not only higher than others, but in some aspects the highest possible, the supreme or maximal being—supreme, in temporal endurance and in power to embrace within itself the content and value of the beings. This supreme natural being is nature herself, taken not distributively, but as an integrated individual. (BH, 57)

God as nature herself is the vision achieved by the panentheist Hartshorne accounting for the source of the pragmatic value of human nature in a rationally defensible manner. It includes in itself the intrinsic value, Beauty, of the universe, including humanity. This latter value, however, realizes itself only as the self-expression of a free and bottomless cause, Formless Self, as
was most clearly elucidated by the Zen atheist Hisamatsu (see Section II).

Since the intrinsic value, Beauty, is the most fundamental value of all values, it is presupposed as well as included by God. When we attend to the mode of this value, Beauty, being presupposed by God, we find ourselves concerned, with the Zennist Hisamatsu, with the “livable” aspect of the pragmatic value of human nature, Praxis. However, when we recognize that whatever is presupposed in the universe as the ground of all values is at once to be the object of God’s benevolent inclusion into the bosom of God’s actuality, we affirm, with the neo-classical panentheist Hartshorne, the validity of the “rationally” defensible aspect of the pragmatic value inherent in human nature—with much confidence. For this validity is an “at once” validity shot through not only with the Eastern or Zennist but also with the Western or Christian orientations. It, I believe, is the very thing which is required for conceiving and constructing in a really convincing manner what Hans Küng refers to as “a Global Ethic” today inasmuch as “We all have the responsibility for a better world order.”

In my own opinion, however, we just need at the base of ourselves the power of vindicating the said “at once” validity of the two aspects of the pragmatic value of human nature. This power is God as the one who alone can and actually does evoke in a supreme fashion our craturely loyalty/fidelity/truthfulness in the matter of Praxis as the “source” (arche) of the intended instrumental value of human nature or Goodness. Our two authors do not touch upon this important issue, though, as I critically mentioned earlier.
NOTES

*This is the revised version of a paper originally prepared for the American Academy of Religion Annual Meeting at Dallas, Texas, December 19–22, 1983.


2. Charles Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1937), p. 44; hereinafter cited as BH.


5. Hartshorne, CSPM, p. 308.


8. If one rejects the notion of value as something “intrinsic,” one will be necessitated to “assess the excellence of a life as a whole on the basis of the actual life’s approximation to the expected or demanded ideal pattern” (Kurt Baier, “What is Value?: An Analysis of the Concept,” in Kurt Baier and Nicholas Rescher (eds.), Values and the Future, New York: The Free Press, p. 42). Now the value or excellence of life depends upon humans’ realization of some hypothesized ideals. There is no real, ontological basis for axiology any more. Of course one can speak of worthwhileness (or the livable aspect of the pragmatic value, to use my terminology), worthiness (or the intended instrumental value), and worth (or the rationally defensible aspect of the pragmatic value)—but only phenomenologically, as does Baier as follows: “The worthwhileness of a life as a whole
is determined on the basis of the extent to which the life approximates the life pattern from whose realization the person in question (rightly or legitimately) expects to derive those satisfactions, rewards, or ‘payoffs,’ which would incline him to say that the life as a whole was worthwhile.... The worthiness of a life as a whole is determined on the basis of the extent to which it satisfies the legitimate demands others may make and expect to have satisfied.... the worth of a life as a whole is determined on the basis of how much it contributes to the excellence of the lives of others” (ibid., pp. 43-44).

9. Charles Hartshorne, *A Natural Theology for Our Time* (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1967), p. 22; hereinafter cited as NTfOT.


13. Insofar as the Formless Self (or Emptiness), according to Mahayana Buddhism in general and Hisamatsu in particular, is not to be hypostatized as the ultimate, eternal substance or ideal but is to be realized as “me,” it is of fundamental axiological significance. What I primarily mean by axiology is not the usual scholarly sense of the term—embracing the element of “intentionality” in religious experiences, as when Frederick J. Streng states: “...they [religious experiences as psycho-socio-physical processes] *establish* priorities and they are called religious because they are experienced and defended as ultimately significant by a person or a community” (“Understanding Christian and Buddhist Personal Transformation: Luther’s Justification by Faith and the Indian Perfection of Wisdom,” *Buddhist-Christian Studies*, Vol. 2, 1982, 17; italics his). If we take axiology primarily to mean intentionality or *telos* in religious experiences,
then we will have to stop using it when it comes to dealing with Buddhism. For its major emphases are on Emptiness or nonsubstantiality or radical relationality of all things and No-mind or existential break-through of the desiderative structure of human existence. In this sense Masao Abe is right when he criticizes Streng by saying, "...Suchness is realized neither through religious intentionality nor in terms of value orientation, but is realized only by overcoming all religious intentionality and all value orientation" ("Comments on Christian and Buddhist Personal Transformation," op. cit., 48-49). However, if we might take axiology primarily to mean the Self-to-self relationship, as mentioned earlier, then we should regard Abe's total negation of axiology as untenable and Streng's understanding of anatman as "empty of essential value" (ibid., 39) as incorrect. However, if I am correct, Abe might be meaning the same thing as my notion of intrinsic value by his wording of "a transaxiological structure" (Abe, op. cit., 49) and Streng might be also implying the same, though mixed up with his intentionality-axiology, when he states: "All beings are empty of essential value [in the sense of own being], including the bodhisattva. At the same time, all beings in their interrelatedness, that is, in their Suchness, have value [in the sense of the Self-to-self, intrinsic, relationship] to the extent that the interrelatedness does not suggest attachment, but manifests enlightenment" (Streng, ibid., 42).


and beyond, has recently been the subject of re-appraisal by Seiichi Yagi, Masao Abe, Ryōmin Akizuki, and Masaaki Honda in their co-authored book *Bukkyō to Kirisutokyō: Takizawa Katsumi tō no taimotsu o motomete* (Buddhism and Christianity: In Search of a Dialogue with Katsumi Takizawa) (Tokyo: San’ichi Shobo, 1981).


22. Cf. “God cannot benefit another without benefiting himself. In his case self-interest and altruism are indeed coincident, but not in the usual utilitarian sense that he is clever enough to do us good so as to satisfy his own egoistic desires, since he has no egoistic desires, but only a supreme interest in creaturely good in a supreme sympathy with the creature’s happiness they seek for themselves” (SCPM, 310).


28a. This grasp of the “at once” validity of the two aspects of the pragmatic value may correspond (although within the purview of the metaphysical–cum–religious axiology of human nature in our case) to what Risieri Frondizi proposes to designate as “value as a Gestalt quality.” He writes: “In brief, value is a Gestalt quality, the synthesis of objective and subjective contribution,
and which exists and has meaning only in concrete human situations. It has a double connection with reality since the value structure springs from empirical qualities and the object in which it is embodied is part of the reality we live in. But on the other hand, values cannot be reduced to the empirical qualities that support them nor to the value objects in which they are embodied. The possibility of new value objects is always open” (What Is Value? [La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1971], pp.164–65). In our case, this issue of axiological "openness" has been explored at the deeper levels than the level of the pragmatic value: i.e., intrinsic and intended instrumental values as they are considered in terms of the metaphysical ultimate qua "Formless Self" and the religious ultimate qua “the all-inclusive love of God.”


30. Cf. “My intuition on this point [i.e., the usage of the term force in a religious context] is that Hartshorne is so concerned to say something ‘meaningful’ about God that some of the mystery of the divine is lost (although Hartshorne does locate the mystery in the divine actuality)” (William E. Kaufman, The Case for God, St. Louis, MO: Chalice Press, 1991, p.103).