PORTRAYING "AUTHENTIC EXISTENCE" BY
THE METHOD OF
ANALOGY: TOWARD CREATIVE USES OF THE
ANALOGY OF
ATTRIBUTION DUORUM AD TERTIUM FOR
COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION*

Part I

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Introduction

This essay is so composed as to portray "authentic existence" as it appears in at least three types of philosophy of religion: Thomism, Protestant Confessionalism, and Whiteheadian process thought as it can be compared with the Nishida School of Buddhist philosophy in Japan. The method of study I am going to employ below is analogical.

Needless to say, the notion of "authentic (eigentlich) existence" as a philosophical question originates in the thought of Martin Heidegger in his celebrated volume Sein und Zeit (1927) and designates the mode of our human projection of any concrete act in view of the whole structure of what we really are or Existentiale. Heidegger counts as such authentic modes discovery of self as already in the world (Befindlichkeit), understanding (Verstehen), and discourse (Rede). An inauthentic (uneigentlich) mode of standing-in, on the contrary, is one in which Dasein, so concerned with the necessities of daily life, relates himself to things by projections which ignore the implication of the full structure of his possibilities—that is, by projections such as ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit), curiosity (Neugier), and prattle (Gerede).¹

Let me, however, foretell here that my use of the notion of "authentic existence" is not necessarily the same as Heidegger's.
In the present essay I am standing on the premise that this notion can be used in a broader sense than Heidegger originally meant in *Sein und Zeit*. This is in part because he himself later came through the *Kehre* of his thought to the position in which the authentic existence began to be coterminous with the *Dasein’s* devotion or correspondence (*Entsprechung*) to the ultimate reality, the *Wahrung der Wahrheit*, the verifying of truth—a drastic break-through of his existentialist-phenomenological analysis of *Dasein*. What I have in mind is that we can refer to any mode of existence as “authentic” if it corresponds positively to the “fundamental structure of reality” of whatever sort. And since “positive correspondence” is the intent of the concept of analogy, for instance in Karl Barth, I shall pursue the portrayal of “authentic existence” in terms of a study of the problem of analogy as regards the afore-mentioned three types of philosophy of religion.

More specifically, I shall engage in elucidating two creative possibilities for the enterprise of comparative philosophy of religion of today of the use of the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium* (two to the third), one of the four types of the theological analogy that Thomas Aquinas dealt with under the general heading of Analogia Entis. Let me first clarify the position of this analogy in the whole scheme of Aquinas’ doctrine of Analogia Entis and then articulate my intention of creative uses of it.

**Section I: A Critical Survey of the Thomist Doctrine of Analogy**

The analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium* is an analogy that is valid between two entities due to the relation that each of them bears to a third. For example, if the adjective “healthy” is applied to both Fort Worth and the complexion of Mr. Smith who lives there, this double attribution of the adjective can only be guaranteed as legitimate on the condition that in its strict and primary application the adjective applies neither to
Fort Worth nor to the complexion but to Mr. Smith. Therefore, one may say that Fort Worth induces, the complexion of Mr. Smith manifests, and Mr. Smith enjoys, health.

It is well known that Aquinas himself has constantly warned against its use in theology.² This might be because this type of analogy can have little or no application to the case, according to E. L. Mascall, where we are attributing the same predicate to God and to creature, for “there is no being antecedent to God to whom the predicate can apply more formally and properly than it applies to him.”² The over-all negative attitude among Thomistic thinkers toward this type of analogy is therefore expressive of their basic theological stance, transcendental theism. For them there can be, in the universe, no reality more real or more ultimate than God; therefore, God is to be called Ipsum Esse Subsistens. That is to say, their negation of this analogy is, from a proper theological perspective, a result of their identification of the religious ultimate (i.e., God) with the metaphysical ultimate (i.e., Being).

From this perspective, the reason why the analogy of attribution duorum ad tertium is to be ruled out is commensurate with the reason why the analogy of attribution unius ad alterum (one to another) has to be maintained. In this latter type of analogy the predicate belongs formally and properly to one of the analogates (or, more accurately, to the prime analogate), and only relatively and derivatively to the other.³ Theologically, this means that God is the cause of creatures and all that they have; therefore, the word “good,” for instance, applies properly and infinitely to God, but only derivatively and finitely to creatures. In my opinion, this type of analogy can best be understood in terms of Henry N. Wieman’s distinction between “created goods” and “Creative Good.” What is important in this analogy is God’s relation of creation over the world. Hence, creatures are to be considered “effects-implying-cause.”

Because the identification of God with Being is central in Thomism, and because this identification is combined with the
notion of Creator, God for Thomists is primum et maxime ens as well as ipsum esse subsistens. This view of God is the very basis for the third and most famous type of analogy, the analogy of proper proportionality. This type of analogy consists in the proportionality,

\[
\frac{\text{essence of creature}}{\text{existential act of creature}} :: \frac{\text{essence of God}}{\text{existential act of God}}.
\]

There are three principles operative in the analogical constitution of this proportionality: (1) the relation of creation; (2) the priority of existence; and (3) the intra-theistic identity of existence and essence.⁴ There are some debates among Thomists as to which principle is pivotal in maintaining the bond in the proportionality. For instance, for R. Garrigou-Lagrange the third principle is pivotal because the third term in the formula is given to us in and through the analogy, whereas for M.T.L. Penido the second principle is pivotal because the fourth term is given to us prior to the analogy.⁵ However, as to the essential importance of the first principle there is no split of opinions among Thomists. At any rate, it is important that in this type of analogy Thomists are attempting to answer one of the most significant questions in philosophical theology: How are Being, God, and beings related to each other?

The fourth type of analogy is the analogy of metaphorical proportionality.⁶ For instance, the lion is called the king of the beasts because he bears to savage animals a relation similar to that which a king bears to his subjects. But Thomists do not regard this type of analogy as theologically significant. This might be largely connected with their inability of accounting for the responsive, salvific nature of God, the nature we predicate of deity, as when we say, “The Lord is my shepherd.”

As stated earlier, the purpose of this essay is to portray “authentic existence” by elucidating the possibility of creatively using the analogy of attribution duorum ad tertium for comparative philosophy of religion. For I contend that the reason for Thomists’ negation of the analogy is theologically untenable. They say
that there is no being antecedent to God. If they mean creature by being, they are right. But we could refer to that which is antecedent to God as something greater than creature—e.g., Being or the Divine. And yet I do not mean by this any intention of subsuming God under the highest generalization, the concept of being, because if that be the case I as a human being in my thinking might thereby gain control over God, who subsequently might become a concept at my disposal. Rather, I mean Being as the ultimate metaphysical reality antecedent, metaphysically, to God as the ultimate religious reality. In other words, it may be that Thomists' identification of God with Being, and of existence with essence in God, is not necessarily right.

In my opinion, the problem of analogy, as transference of human language, drawn from mundane experience, to the realm of the Divine, is ontologically preceded by the nature of the Divine as it is envisaged by us. Hence, analogy can be conterminous with "authentic existence" as correspondent to the Divine who constitutes the fundamental structure of reality. I admit that the epistemological and logical priorities prevail in analogy within the framework of the epistemic mode of being insofar as we are concerned in epistemology with "being as known" and in logic with "modes of being universally accruing to things as known in and for second intentional (i.e., reflexive -conceptual) knowledge."5a But these two priorities give way to the ontological priority when it comes to transferring human language to the realm of the Divine. For the mode of signification peculiar to epistemology and logic, as Thomas Aquinas claims, is to be superseded by the perfection signified, that is, by the perfection of Being or the Divine inherent in things as things which epistemology and logic must both presuppose. Thus the final question in the problem of analogy is: What kind of vision do we ultimately have about Being or the Divine? This is an ontological, not an epistemological or logical, question.

Therefore, if there is, as I assume, a theological standpoint
from which it can be maintained that there is a third reality which is
antecedent to God, then the afore-mentioned type of analogy obtains a
strong ontological guarantee. For instance, we could think of such
a triangular standpoint both in terms of the distinction of the
two natures of God (as in Luther’s deus absconditus or the
Hidden God and deus revelatus or the Revealed God) and in
terms of the distinction of the metaphysical ultimate and the
religious ultimate (as in Whitehead’s creativity and God), with
the world being the experiential basis of it in either case.

These two cases of the triangular standpoint provide
critical correctives for the entitative view of God in Thomism
that inheres in an essentially uneasy admixture of God as ipsum
esse subusistens and God as primum et maxime ens. Thomists,
however, would claim that with God the distinction between ens
or essence and esse or existence does not hold, and that God is
His own esse.⁶ But this claim, quite ironically, is to lead their
initial existentialism to end up with the static naming of God as
the uncaused cause or causa sui. As Heidegger critically assumed
in the essay on “The Onto-theological Nature of Metaphysics,”
to this God man can neither pray nor sacrifice, neither fall to
his knee in awe nor sing and dance.⁶ It is precisely in view of
this difficulty that Luther’s religious, and Whitehead’s metaphysical,
break-through of the entitative God are both important in that
they respectively open up new avenues for genuinely perceiving
God and Being or creativity. For Luther deus absconditus, who
orders humans to live according to retributive justice, is made
intelligible only in and through the experience of the revealed
God in Jesus Christ. For Whitehead God as primordial is perceived
only as the primordial exemplification of the metaphysical
ultimate, creativity. God is now the One who supremely and
maximally concresces, not Being. But along these lines it might
be still possible for us to retain the proportionate-analogical
ontology of Thomism in some sense.

With this triangular standpoint in mind, I shall demonstrate
a Christological vindication of the analogy of attribution duorum ad
tertium by studying Martin Luther’s doctrine of justification and prayer in Section II and a *metaphysical* articulation of it by scrutinizing Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy of organism in comparison with Kitaro Nishida’s philosophy of the *topos* of absolute Nothingness in Section III. As shall be shown, the re-interpretation of this analogy in terms of Luther’s *theologia crucis* needs the supplements by Karl Barth’s doctrine of analogy (involving Analogia Fidei and Analogia Relationis) and by Wolfhart Pannenberg’s doxological analogy; and our Whiteheadian use of this analogy accounts for the proper significance of Dorothy Emmet’s, Susanne Langer’s, and Charles Hartshorne’s considerations of the problem of analogy. As shall be articulated in Section IV, the resultant vision is a creative synthesis of Revealed Theology and Natural Theology—one which can involve in a coherent manner at least four streams of philosophy of religion: Thomism, Protestant Confessionalism, Whiteheadian process thought, and the Nishida School of Buddhist philosophy. Each of these, in my view, is analogically authentic in its respectively proper articulation of the fundamental structure of reality.

**Section II: A Christological Re-interpretation of the Analogy of Attribution duorum ad tertium: Luther, Barth, and Pannenberg**

A. *Martin Luther: Justification and Prayer in The Lectures on Romans (Römerbriefvorlesung) As a Hint*

Luther himself shows no sympathy with the Thomistic doctrine of analogy, Analogia Entis.7 This might be because he finds in the notion of existence as the “present state of things” a static ontology devoid of the Biblical view of things “in terms of what they will be.”8 Therefore, to reinterpret the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium*, which is one of the four types of analogy discussed by Thomas Aquinas, in the light of Luther’s *theologia crucis* is my own motif, not his. However, I may be qualified in this business partly by the fact that Aquinas has
discarded this type of analogy for the reasons mentioned in the preceding section, and partly by the fact that Luther, at least to my mind, has demonstrated a unique possibility of speaking of God commensurate with this type of analogy—and this in terms of his pre-Reformation doctrine of justification and prayer developed in the 1515-1516 Römerbriefvorlesung.

It is Rudolf Hermann who has first articulated the correlation of justification and prayer in Luther’s exegesis of Rom. 3 in the Lectures. According to him, Luther has come to realize in the lectures that without prayer neither justification nor ourselves can be understood. In this sense, for Luther prayer plays the role of interconnection between the metaphysical problem of the Incarnation (“Cur Deus homo”) and the radical transformation of one’s-evaluation-of-oneself (“die to sin”), thus entailing the doctrine of justification, as H.J. Iwand assumes, as “a sort of theological anthropology.”

I think it important in this connection that Luther finds the motif of “deum justificare” in Rom. 3:4 (= Ps. 51:4): “Let God be true though every man be false, as it is written, ‘That thou mayest be justified in thy words, and prevail when thou art judged’” (RSV). He writes:

The Greek text reads: ‘God shall be truthful’ or ‘Let God be truthful.’ These words give expression not so much to the truthfulness of God as to a confession of the truthfulness of God. What they mean is this: It is right that all should confess and admit that God is truthful. (LR, 63-4)

As Hermann rightly notices here, the believer addresses himself or herself to God in the act of prayer; and prayer here is not only a form but also the content of faith itself. In the acknowledgement of God’s righteousness in the act of prayer are indeed included all the factors of Christian faith—justification, repentance, and new life. Further, in it is included, in my opinion, a new possibility of the use of the analogy of attribution duorum ad tertium.
It is very important that Luther distinguishes between saying simply that “God is justified” and saying that “God is justified in his words or works.” For “God as he is in himself can be justified by none, because he is justice itself, nor can be judged, because he himself is eternal law and judgment and truth” (LR, 64). This is because for Luther God’s life touches us in two ways: he is first God as he is in himself or the Hidden God (deus absconditus or nudus) emerging in creation’s masks and ordering humans to live according to the principle of retributive justice; but we also find God as the Revealed One (deus revelatus), in Jesus Christ. He therefore knows both the tremendum-element and the fascinosum-element of God’s righteousness.

If that is the case, we can here notice a case that there is a third reality, i.e., deus nudus or absconditus, antecedent to God as deus revelatus and humanity—a vindication of the theological validity of the analogy of attribution duorum ad tertium. It follows that we might explicate the analogy in terms of the notion of justice or righteousness in the following fivefold manner:

(1) God as he is in himself or deus nudus or absconditus is justice itself; he is therefore to be called the prime analogate in which justice exists intrinsically.

(2) By contrast, the Revealed God (deus revelatus) in Jesus Christ is a creative—redemptive justice; he is therefore the first minor analogate in which justice exists extrinsically—extrinsically in the sense of the ad extra relationship of God to humanity, that is, the Incarnation.

(3) Prayer, as the confessional existence of the Christian believer, is the second minor analogate; as such, it is utterly devoid of its own retributive or meritorious justice before God as he is in himself and yet is righteous in that it receives justice as a creative—redemptive gift from the first minor analogate, the Revealed God as the extrinsic justice of God, in response to its innermost, Augustinian petition: Da quod iubes (Give me what you order).
(4) The relation of the first minor analogate to the second one can be called the analogy of attribution *unius ad alterum*, in the sense of a salvific interpersonalism between Jesus as the Christ and the believer as he or she is confessionally existing; thus the extrinsic justice of God is extrinsic in its double sense—that is, extrinsic to the believer as well as to the Hidden God, the reason why Luther calls Christ’s redemptive love “alien righteousness” (*justitia aliena*).

(5) In conclusion, our new interpretation of the analogy means that the believer existentially—confessionally induces (or, rather, receives), the Revealed God manifests, and the Hidden God enjoys, justice. Here the transferability of justice-language to God is based upon the paradoxical fact, which is at the core of Luther’s *theologia crucis*, that God is everywhere in terms of ontology as it is best explicated by the Thomistic Analogy of Being and yet is nowhere other than in Jesus Christ and him crucified in terms of salvation. We could express this truth with these two formulae: (1) from the divine perspective, \( \overrightarrow{HB} \) (mysterium tremendum) = \( \overrightarrow{HR} \) (Incarnation) + \( \overrightarrow{RB} \) (Justification); and (2) from the human perspective, \( \overrightarrow{BH} \) (coram Deo) = \( \overrightarrow{BR} \) (Faith) + \( \overrightarrow{RH} \) (Atonement). (See Fig. I below.)

![Diagram](image)

**Fig. I**

Pivotal in our re-interpretation of the analogy, as in the above, is the fact that we have found in Luther a dual vision of the Deity as both Hidden and Revealed. This vision provides
us a theological means by which to challenge the Thomistic charge that the prime analogate in the analogy is simply a "genus," and that the logic inherent in the analogy is "generic predication" which runs counter to the essence of the theological analogy, Analogia Entis. The Hidden God is not a genus but a divine reality which is above and beyond the reality of the Revealed God. Accordingly, our predication of this God as justice in terms of the analogy of attribution _duorum ad tertium_, as in point 5 above, is not a generic one but is a confessional adoration of Him, while mediated by our faith in the Revealed God.

As such, our predication of God as justice (i.e., "deum justificare") necessarily takes the form of confession of sin. For, as Luther states,

...there it is stated that God is justified by the confession of our sin. Even though he is righteous and truthful in himself, he is not so in us unless we confess and say: "Against thee only, have I sinned" (Ps. 51:4). Then he is acknowledged as the only, righteous one. And so he is made righteous also in us. (LR,66)

Further,

Oh, that we might willingly be emptied that we might be filled with thee; Oh, that I may willingly be weak that thy strength may dwell in me; gladly a sinner that thou mayest be justified in me (Libenter peccator ut tu iustificeris in me). (LR,70-1)

Thus justification is, for Luther, "a living process, a becoming and happening, into which God himself enters, and into which he drags the human being." This is because God is not, as Aquinas assumes, a transcendent cause (which is to be understood by the Thomistic Analogy of Being consisting of the analogy of proper proportionality combined with the analogy of attribution _unius ad alterum_) but a living, personal reality. Luther resorts to the metaphor of the good Samaritan (Luke 10:30ff.) to depict justification as such a living, personal encounter
of God with humanity. For him Christ is the Good Samaritan; under the aspect of his salvific action for us sinners we are all like the sick man who is actually sick, but who is healthy by virtue of the sure prediction of the physician whom he believes (LR, 127). Here we can see a most articulate example of the analogy of metaphorical proportionality.

B. Karl Barth: Analogia Fidei and Analogia Relationis

As elucidated above, inherent in Luther’s doctrine of justification and prayer are three types of analogy (i.e., the analogy of attribution duorum ad tertium, the analogy of attribution unius ad alterum, and the analogy of metaphorical proportionality) which are combined in a tight linkage. This is, as I admitted in the preceding sub-section, my own view, not his. It is my contention in this connection that the basic structure of Protestant Confessional theology consists in the combination of these three types of analogy, with the analogy of attribution duorum ad tertium being the key analogy in accordance with the dual vision of the Deity as Hidden and Revealed. This may lead to a critical evaluation of the Thomistic Analogy of Being as only hypothetically true in view of human depravity.

It is within this context that we can properly understand the true significance of Karl Barth’s doctrine of analogy involving Analogia Fidei and Analogia Relationis. In my opinion, his Analogia Fidei can make sense as a clarification of the analogy of attribution unius ad alterum inherent in the relationship between the believer and the Revealed God. And his Analogia Relationis is an attempt at elucidating the analogy of metaphorical proportionality hidden in the relationship between the triune God and humanity.

1. Analogia Fidei. In my opinion, the content of Analogia Fidei was already implicit in Barth’s earliest work, Römerbrief (1918), although it is said that his theological method shifted, concomitant with the publication of Fides Quaerens Intellectum.
Anselms Beweis der Existenz Gottes in 1931, from a dialectical one to an analogical one. In the exegesis of Rom. 8:26, "... but the Spirit with pre-eminent power makes intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered," he poses his dialectical method in terms of the "justification of prayer" as follows:

The justification of our prayer is not that we have attained some higher eminence on the ladder of prayer; for all ladders of prayer are erected within the sphere of the 'No-God' of this world. The justification of our prayer and the reality of our communion with God are grounded upon the truth that Another, the Eternal, the Second Man from Heaven (I Cor. xv. 47), stands before God pre-eminent in power and—in our place.

Here prayer, as human piety, is once totally negated and yet is restored on the basis of the intercession of the living Christ. This is because for Barth Christ, being the end of history or the pre-history, is the origin of time. Christ, as the finis orationis or the radical negation of human religiosity, is the origin of prayer (principium orationis). Thus he is the justification of our prayer.

We could compare, then, this notion with Barth's later definition of Analogia Fidei in Church Dogmatics, I/1 (1932). There Barth understands "analogia" or what he calls "man's conformity with God which takes place in faith, and the 'point of contact' with the Word of God posited in this conformity" as "the sole work of the actual grace of God [such] that the only final word left us at this point is that God acts in His word on man," but not as "an inborn or accessory attribute of man." By this he has rejected the Thomistic idea of Analogia Entis, together with Emil Brunner's idea of the "point of contact" between God and the human being and Rudolf Bultmann's idea of "pre-understanding" of God by the human being, inasmuch as these ideas presuppose an independent and isolated human reasoning apart from God's self-disclosure in Jesus Christ. Hence, Barth's notion of Analogia Fidei is expressive of the
divine, gracious univocity with us as we are in faith, the fact which is commensurate with his notion of the justification of prayer.

Barth himself does not use the term "univocity," though. It is my own interpretation of his Analogia Fidei to find in it the element of univocity, the element which was totally negated by Aquinas in his Analogia Entis. In including the element of univocity—which I prize here only insofar as it obtains its significance in the ontological order (ordo essendi) of God's self-disclosure to us, rather than in the epistemological order (ordo cognoscenti) of our human faculty of knowing God—in the notion of analogy implying the knowability of God I am in line with Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. However, I can find some rationale for my standpoint in Barth himself; he regards Analogia Entis as theologically untenable because it is the analogy to which we resort only in a situation in which "we do not have to consider the being of God in His work and activity, but only as such and in abstracto." In other words, for Barth it is essential to include the salvific activity of God for us in the notion of analogy.

2. Analogia Relationis. Strangely enough, however, when it comes to accounting for Analogia Relationis, Barth's use of the term "analog" tends to be metaphorical rather than univocal. Analogia Relationis is a sort of the analogy of metaphorical proportionality, as I mentioned before. What is the reason for this strange fact? My explanation is as follows.

For Barth God as he is in himself is relational because he is triune in that he is, as Father, related to Son and vice versa (and this in terms of the communication as love of Holy Spirit), and humanity is also relational because it consists in the male–female relationship, the most visible feature of the imago Dei. The divine and human relationalities are combined analogically, the former providing the ontological basis for the latter and the latter corresponding to the former. As Eberhard
Jüngel rightly points out, for Barth the doctrine of the Trinity, by the proposition of the *perichoresis* (Lat., circuminessio; Ger., Kreislauf; Eng., circulation) of the three divine modes of being, is the ontological basis for Analogia Relationis between God’s being for himself and his being for us.\(^{23}\) However, Barth does not want to speak of the divine–human relationship as *datum* but only as *dandum*, that is, something to be given to us by the Holy Spirit in the midst of our act of faith. Thus, Analogia Relationis is fundamentally conditioned by Analogia Fidei.\(^{24}\)

However, this implies that Barth has not fully articulated the difference between the ontological relationship between God and humanity and our knowledge of it. It is true that we need faith in order fully to come to realize the divine–human relationship. But it is also true that the divine–human relationship itself is a reality which exists before our knowledge of it emerges in faith. This is the issue which has been critically raised by one of Barth’s Japanese pupils, Katsumi Takizawa. Takizawa’s contention is, in short, that the fundamental contact of God and humanity lies at the bottom of our human existence prior to the Incarnation of the Word of God in Jesus of Nazareth. Hence, he calls this contact the *Proto-factum* Immanuel (God with us) identifiable with the Logos. Barth’s error, according to Takizawa, is that he views the *Proto-factum* as first initiated by the Incarnation.\(^{25}\) Takizawa’s charge is basically right, but it should be consolidated in more precise terms in view of the fact that Barth himself speaks of the pre-history as the being of Jesus in the beginning with God.\(^{26}\) In my own view, Barth’s reference to the pre-existent God–man still lacks the ontological motivation of the unity of God with *all creation* (not merely with the man Jesus)—the reason why Takizawa’s motif of the *Proto-factum* Immanuel is theologically tenable.

However, it seems to me that Takizawa does not probe into the real, or more serious, weakness in the theology of Karl Barth: in his theology the intra–trinitarian Godhead\(^{27}\) is not
conceived of as both immediately and internally related to the inner composition of creatures, including humans. What is important now is not the pre-existent Christ or the Logos but some kind of an immediate ontological relationality of the Godhead and creation which is pre-cognitive but real and of which the Logos is the supreme embodiment. This is the area of philosophical theology that is discussed neither by Barth nor by Takizawa but is explored by Whitehead and Buddhists in terms of what they respectively call “creativity” and “Emptiness qua dependent co-origination.” But it is beyond the scope of the present section to consider the matter further. Suffice it to say that because Barth does not base his doctrine of Analogia Relationis upon an internally significant relationship between the Godhead and creation but rather upon a merely formal one (i.e., the male–female partnership), it is no more than an analogy of metaphorical proportionality.

C. Wolfhart Pannenberg: Doxological Analogy

As we can truly understand the motif of Barth’s theology as emerging only in response to Luther’s theologia crucis, so we can truly elucidate the intent of Pannenberg’s theological analogy only against the background of Barthianism. Pannenberg has learned at least two things from Barth: one is revelation as the only real context of the problem of analogy and the other is the view of Analogia Fidei as involving the univocal element in the grace of God (KD, I/1, 252). Yet, he is critical of Barth in two respects. First, Barth does not pay due attention to the situation in which the Christian revelation, while encountering humanity, is limited by the structure of the human partner; that is to say, Barth does not take into account the modus significandi of analogy. Second, Barth asserts that God is “objective” in his revelation (KD, II/1, 232). But for Pannenberg God’s objectivity in the Christ-event does not mean Jesus’ direct answer to the messianic expectation of Judaism; rather, his objectivity is broken in Jesus’ death under a curse; only the
resurrection of Jesus from the dead can speak to us crossing over that brokenness.31

It is against the background of these considerations that Pannenberg poses his doctrine of doxological analogy. It is interesting to notice that he draws the ontological grounding for doxological speech about God from the Lutheran motif of “deum iustificare” mentioned earlier. For instance, it is for Pannenberg on the basis of his deeds that God is praised as eternally good, righteous, and faithful.32 This is because “... we grasp, by means of a single event, the totality of the reality in which we live and around which our lives circulate,”33 God being the origin of that totality.34 It follows that all speech about God is provisional, grounded in the character of all such speech as “analogous transference in the worshipful glorification of God’s sublimity.”35 Thus Pannenberg’s logic is quite Lutheran (see II, A above).

However, it is Pannenberg’s unique contribution to contemporary theology that he has put the motif of “analogical transference in the worshipful glorification of God’s sublimity” into the context of Jesus’ history, thereby completing our figure of the analogy of attribution duorum ad tertium. As a result, he has provided a Christological basis for doxological speech about God; and, conversely, he has elucidated the analogical significance of the historical Jesus in relation to the eternal Logos (i.e., RH in Fig. I above). This is important in that he has thereby broken through the rigidity or stiffness of Barth’s concept of “objective revelation” at least in the following senses:

(1) Pannenberg replaces the objectivity-concept with the provisionality peculiar to human language, the fact that he affirms, with Thomas Aquinas, the modus significandi of analogy. Christologically, this means that the metaphorical or provisional character of our speech about God was shared by Jesus when he spoke of God as “father.”36

(2) Pannenberg does not, however, obliterate the univocal element in analogy and in the Christian revelation—his Barthian
approval of God’s freedom and decision. Christologically, this means that the ultimacy of the self-demonstration of God is grounded in Jesus’ own claim to possess full authority to execute the ultimate will of God over every man who encountered him.\(^37\)

(3) Pannenberg clarifies the proleptic element in analogy and revelation, to the effect that the univocal element is itself provisional or metaphorical in reference to the *perfectio significata* as the Eschaton. Christologically, this means that, although the resurrection of Jesus from the dead brought about for the first time a confirmation of his claim by God himself,\(^38\) our speech about God on the basis of Jesus’ resurrection still remains provisional due to its character as the fore-conception of the universal end of history.\(^38\)

However, the problem is that Pannenberg fails to fully acknowledge that, while our speech about God is provisional and indirect, the ontological relationship of God to humanity in Jesus Christ (i.e., HR or Incarnation) can be, and actually is, immediately real.\(^40\) Analogy as our human adoration of God presupposes God’s immediate relationship to us. To express the same thing in terms of my interpretation of the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium*, BH = BR + RH presupposes HB = HR + RB (see Fig. I). As such, the former formula testifies to the authenticity of the Protestant Confessional existence as “righteous.”

(To be continued)
NOTES:

* This is a revised version of a paper originally presented at a Round Table session which was held in the American Academy of Religion Annual Meeting at Palmer House in Chicago, December 8–10, 1984 in preparation for the creation of a new AAR consultation on “Process Thought, the Nishida School of Buddhist Philosophy in Comparative Perspective."

   1a. Ibid., p. 100.
3. Ibid., pp. 101–102. It is important to notice, however, that from the point of view of an epistemological priority we know and name God from the effects of Deity, although the properties of the effects are derived from the powers of Deity. See *C. Gent.*, I, 34: see also James F. Ross, “Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language” in Anthony Kenny, ed., *Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Notre Dame, IND: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), p. 110. Ross has successfully argued that ordinary language (for instance, a term which by both logical and psychological priority is employed in a statement which says “The world is made, planned, and judged by God”) is employed analogically in a theological statement such as “God is the artificer, the designer, the judge,” given the Christian assumption that God is transcendent and different in kind from all other things (ibid., p. 138). However, his stance is relevant neither to the case in which God (i.e., cause) is perceived and named not only in relation to the world (i.e., effect) but also in relation to the self-disclosure of this God (i.e., mediator) nor to the case in which God is
perceived and named not only in relation to the world but also in relation to the metaphysical ultimate (i.e., the supreme principle of mutual conditioning of God and the world).


5. Ibid., p. 111.

6. For the fourfold typology of analogy, see ibid., p. 104, n. 2. In this respect some parts of the following works are also suggestive: Mondin, op.cit.; Gerald B. Phelan, St. Thomas and Analogy (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1948); George P. Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960); and Ralph M. McInerny, The Logic of Analogy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961).


10. Ibid., p. 12.


14. Hermann, op.cit., p. 19. Cf.: "Karl Barth may have sharpened in a Trinitarian way Luther's statement about God's becoming (fieri)" (Eberhard Jüngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity: God's Being


With respect to being (ens), this means that, whereas it is predicated “analogically or equivocally” when it is taken as a perfect and proper concept, being (ens) as an imperfect and common concept is “univocal” to God and creature and to substance and accident, etc. For Scotus, being, basically, is one of many concepts which must be “unequivocal” (i.e., univocal) because otherwise we could not reason at all about God. (Opus Oxoniense, I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 4, no. 5., cited by Julius R. Weinberg, A Short History of Medieval Philosophy, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964, p. 217, n. 3.)

Ockham, too, maintains that, although being (ens) is “equivocal” when applied to objects belonging to different categories, there is a “univocal” concept common to God and creature. For, as Weinberg explicates Ockham, if there is any natural knowledge of God, it must be in terms of a concept common to God and creature, the univocal concept of being. (Sent., III, q. 9, Q, R, S; Sent., I, d. 2, q. 9, K, L, M; cited by Weinberg, A Short History..., pp. 262–263.)

20. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/1, trans. by T.H.L. Parker, W.B. Johnson, H. Knight, J.L.M. Haire (Edinburgh: T. & T.

22. Barth, KD, III/1, pp. 216–220.

23. Barth, CD, II/1, p. 297.


26. Barth, CD, II/2, p. 104. Barth at times seems to be thinking of the pre-history (i.e., the being of Jesus in the beginning with God) as the ontological relationship between God and humanity, that is, as "eternal covenant" (CD, II/2, p. 105; cf. Eberhard Jüngel, *The Doctrine of the Trinity: God’s Being is in Becoming*, p. 74). However, this, in my view, contradicts another of his ideas that the intra-trinitarian relationship is in proportion to the intra-mundane (e.g., male-female) relationships, because the pre-history cannot be intrinsically explicative of the intra-mundane relationships. In my opinion, the divine-human bond or covenant must be such a notion as is capable of explicating intrinsically both the intra-trinitarian Godhead and the intra-mundane relationships. I can find such a notion of bond in Whitehead’s creativity, as shall be discussed later. Then my formulation of proportionality is like this: The Godhead as creativity is the creativity of creatures. In this formulation the “is” is the bond between the two creativities and is in itself creativity.

27. Cf. CD, II/1, p. 297. According to Jüngel, op.cit., p. 68, for Barth the doctrine of the Trinity, by the proposition of the *perichoresis* (Lat., circuminessio: Ger., Kreislauf; Eng., circulation) of the three divine modes of being, is the ontological basis for the *analogia relationis* between God’s being for himself and his being for us. Interestingly enough, Jüngel refers in this connection to Hegel’s notion of the “concrete” unity of God’s being as “concrescere” (to grow together) (op.cit., p. 32). For a different exposition of the *perichoresis* by Johannes Damascens, see Jürgen Moltmann, *Trinität und Reich Gottes: Zur Gotteslehre* (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1980), pp. 191.


(Theologische Literaturzeitung, 1953, no. 1), p. 22.
30. Along these lines Pannenberg critically assumes that Barth's idea of analogy is an analogia attributionis extrinsecae, in the sense that the analogicity refers to the analogatum (creature) only externally as regards its existence and the form of its relationship to the analogons (God), while referring to the analogons internally. In Pannenberg's opinion, Quenstedt's notion of "analogia attributionis intrinsecae" is more appropriate (see Pannenberg, op. cit., p. 21).
33. Ibid., p. 229.
34. Ibid., p. 230.
35. Ibid., p. 234.
36. Ibid., p. 235.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p. 236.
40. Cf.: "What is the last thing for human knowledge is first with regard to being. Whereas Jesus is not recognizable as the Son of God until his death on the cross and his resurrection, in the order of being he is the Son of God before this history takes place" (Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1974, p. 91).