God and Emptiness: Cause, Reasons, and the World's Abyss
[Forms of Panentheism in Religion and Nature]*

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In speaking of the theme of "God and Emptiness" within the context of "the dialogue between science and religion about creation and nature in view of questions about causality and determination" like we do in this conference, I think one of the most important issues to be considered is the relationship between God's causality and God's omnipotence/omniscience. I have come up with this issue at the end of my recent article entitled "How Can We Co-ordinate the Vertical Order to the Horizontal Order, and vice versa, in Metaphysics Cogently?: Uwe Meixner, Process Thought, and Nishida-tetsugaku" which I wrote for the philosophy journal "Polylog" (Vienna). I have been particularly attentive to Uwe Meixner's following dictum which is crucial for his "Metaphysics of Event and Substance." He writes:

The laws of nature, the regularities that make up the order of the world, totally penetrating it, come from his [God's] choice (which must for this reason be a completely foreseeing one). Hence the nomologically constraining character of the laws of nature is not objective in itself (as naturalists think), it is, however, objectively given by God. The necessity that they carry with them (the ananke of ancient metaphysics) does not exist in itself without relation to an agent but is rooted in God's causality and gains its constraining character and its character of partly pre-determining the future from his omnipotence and omniscience.¹

I basically affirm what is implied in this dictum--although from my own perspective of what I might call a Buddhist-Christian philosophy based upon the thought of Alfred North Whitehead and Kitaro Nishida. At any rate, what is important for us at this early stage of my lecture is to discern that when we speak of the theme of "God and Emptiness" within the context of "the dialogue between science and religion about
creation," we basically concern ourselves with the whence and/or whither question(s) regarding the problem of "creation" in terms of God's omnipotence/omniscience and also with the how question regarding the process of "creation" in terms of causality (God's causality included). We also have to discern how these two issues are interrelated in the midst of the problem of "creation."

The first issue, dealing with the whence and/or whither of whatever actually is in the universe, is a properly metaphysical or ontological one, while the second issue, accounting for how all creation comes into being in the universe, is a cosmological one. In any metaphysical system, whether it is Christian or Buddhist or whatever, one has to end up with some sort of answer regarding the first question while discussing the second question. And in so doing one is necessarily required to show the way in which the first, ontological question is answered appropriately in correspondence to the second, cosmological question; namely, the third issue is something like what Paul Tillich wanted to pursue in terms of his notion of systematic theology, in the sense of considering the problem inherent in the situation by the method of correlation from his overall viewpoint of the Christian message.

However, there is one crucial difference from Tillich's endeavor of systematic theology in our theme with which I am about to struggle: i.e., "God and Emptiness." I am not presupposing, like Tillich does, the notion of God or the Christian message as the sole answer to the existential questions challenging us (Christians) from within the given situation of humanity (i.e., the human predicament). This is because what is presented before us (Christians) in the form of Buddhist Emptiness is not merely an existential question but is properly an answer, which is important in its own right religiously cum metaphysically. Accordingly, in our age of dialogue between Buddhism and Christianity, at whose coming Tillich has had an insightful glance while writing *Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions* and *Systematic Theology*, Vol. 3 in 1963, the message is both Christian and Buddhist. But the problem is how so?

In what follows let me discuss three things from the above-mentioned threefold perspective, ontological-cosmological-systematic:
first, Charles Hartshorne’s case of metaphysics in which what he calls the “Zero Fallacy” is bitterly repudiated; second, Kitaro Nishida’s case of Buddhist metaphysics in which the place of absolute Nothingness is subsuming everything ultimately affirmatively; and third, my own idea of a Buddhist-Christian philosophy in which the notion of God as the principle of loyalty in the universe is playing a pivotal, mediating role.

I. The Case of Charles Hartshorne: The Zero Fallacy Repudiated and Panentheism/Surrelativism Affirmed

In my 1998 paper “Hartshorne and Nishida: Re-Envisioning the Absolute. Two Types of Panenthism vs. Spinoza’s Pantheism” (now readable at http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers; hereafter cited as HNRA) I argued for Hartshorne’s case of panentheism in comparison with Nishida’s. I wrote:

Hartshorne’s re-envisioning of the notion of the Absolute has been carried out in his thesis, called Surrelativism, also Panentheism. Its main content, according to him, is as follows: “the ‘relative’ or changeable, that which depends upon and varies with varying relationships, includes within itself and in value exceeds the nonrelative, immutable, independent, or ‘absolute,’ as the concrete includes and exceeds the abstract.” From this doctrine it follows, as Hartshorne further maintains, that “God, as supremely excellent and concrete, must be conceived not as wholly absolute or immutable, but rather as supremely-relative, ‘surrelative,’ although, or because of this superior relativity, containing an abstract character or essence in respect to which, but only in respect to which, he is indeed strictly absolute and immutable” (DR, ix). (HNRA, 2)

As is evident above, as I further argued, Hartshorne’s re-envisioning of the notion of the Absolute takes place only by way of putting it within the context of God as “supremely-relative.” In this sense, in order to re-envision the concept of the Absolute, Hartshorne necessarily needs this “supremely-relative” context as that which
includes within itself the Absolute and the universe as a whole together. This, I believe, is what he means when he writes as follows:

...if the universe is eminently animate and rational, then either it is God, or there are two eminent beings, God and Universe, and a third supereminent entity, which is the total reality of God-and-universe. The dilemma is satisfactorily dissolved only by the admission that the God who creates and the inclusive creation are one God. (DR, 79)

As I ascertained further, in saying so Hartshorne is distinguishing his own standpoint of "panentheism" (which is the view that "deity is in some real aspect distinguishable from and independent of any and all relative items, and yet, taken as an actual whole, includes all relative items") from traditional theism or deism (which makes God "solely independent or nonrelative") and also from "pantheism" of Spinoza's type (which is the view that "deity is the all of relative or interdependent items, with nothing wholly independent or in any clear sense nonrelative") (DR, 89-90). Significantly enough, in this manner Hartshorne breaks through an impasse of one-sidedness peculiar not only to the standpoint of traditional theism centering around the notion of the nonrelative Absolute but to Spinoza's pantheism based upon the vision of reality as the nonindependent, solely relative deity coterminous with nature, namely deus sive natura.

Hartshorne's all-inclusive, surrelativistic, panentheistic metaphysics, as mentioned above, however, does not speak of the whence but only of the whither of the universe insofar as the Deity for him is at once the personal God and the universe in that the asymmetrical ongoing process of the universe is ever-lastinglly to be contained in and understood by the Deity. In this sense, the Deity is the goal of the ever-growing Hartshornean universe. It may be because of this characteristic of his metaphysics that Hartshorne takes up the problem of "appearance" and further argues that "the absolute, simply as such, may be termed the appearance of ultimate reality to abstract cognition, including the divine self-cognition in its abstract aspect"
In short, his metaphysics is rather static on the conceptual side, strangely enough, to my mind, while, however, vividly dynamic on the all-inclusive “ad extra” side, as is well known.

In Hartshorne’s all-inclusive metaphysics what is mediating between ontology (i.e., Surrelativism) and cosmology (i.e., Panentheism as the logic of containment of all past entities in the universe into the bosom of the Deity) is the idea of a unique identification of the two, thus entailing the above-mentioned grasp of the problem of “appearance.” By contrast, for Whitehead, “appearance” is co-terminous with the notion of “concrescence” which happens only in conformation to the Reality. It seems to me that something is blockading the dynamic, conceptual passage of the Deity into its innermost depths in Hartshorne’s mind. Does this have something to do with his repudiation of “a merely infinite God” (in the sense of a mere negation of the finite, which is at the core of what he terms the “Zero Fallacy”) as “an intellectual form of idolatry”? That is a problem.

This problem is manifest, if my observation is correct and to the point, when he discloses:

“Dependent origination” and the goal of bringing all things to Buddhahood suggest asymmetry, but the relation of this to nirvana is sheer mystery, so far as I can see.

It is usually supposed, as I noted already seventeen years ago, that Buddhism is a process view of reality. To be sure, its three key categories—transience (Pali, anicca); suffering (dukkha); and No-mind (anatta)—suggest that view. But it is to be remembered, I argued, that Buddhism upholds a process view of reality primarily under the aspect of Method. And I wrote:

That is to say, it speaks of the (acion-) process of Becoming (kamma-bhava) in its terribly negativistic sense only to drive humans to Awakening or Nirvana. Therefore, for Buddhism the use of process language is genuinely soteriological. If we adhered, like Hartshorne did, to a process view of reality throughout, we
would have to depart from Buddhism at the very end, namely, at the most crucial occasion of attaining Nirvana.  

For what is needed there, I now think, would probably be, if expressed in Christian terms, a repudiation (as this takes place within the inner life of the Godhead before taking place in us) of "a merely infinite God plus a merely finite universe."

II. The Case of Kitaro Nishida: the Absolute Negated within the Realm of the Ultimate, thus Paradoxically Tending To Be Absolutely Affirmative of All Creation

Now, let me turn to the case of Nishida. As I noted in my aforementioned Boston paper, in his last essay entitled "The Logic of Place and a Religious Worldview," Nishida reconsiders the notion of the Absolute based upon his own peculiar understanding of the matter of religion as the self's encounter with the divine "only through dying," thus relating to the divine in the manner of an "inverse correspondence" (Jpn., gyaku-taioo). And I wrote:

For him, conversely, the divine dynamics is in itself operative, inversely correspondingly, to this effect: that "The Absolute is truly absolute by facing absolute Nothingness," in the sense that "the Absolute includes in itself absolute self-negation." Evidently, this is the same logic as Nagarjuna's view of emptiness emptying itself, as I examined elsewhere. However, what is unique in Nishida's case is the fact that he has applied this logic of emptiness emptying itself or of the Absolute including in itself absolute self-negation to the discursive argument for the existence of God, as I argued in still another of my recent articles. My specific concern here in this paper is with seeing how the Buddhistic re-envisioning of the notion of the Absolute by Nishida can and actually does give rise to his own version of "panentheism." (HNRA, 3)

Now, as is clear above, what is inherent in Nishida's logic of the
place of absolute Nothingness is the negation of a merely abstract idea of the Absolute like the one depicted by Hartshorne. In Hartshorne’s case, as we have already ascertained, there has occurred a radical inclusion of the Absolute within the context of the inclusive and supreme reality which is precisely the personal God—and this as the Deity’s abstract character. By contrast, noticeably enough, Nishida attacks and challenges the notion of the Absolute itself from within itself, thus transforming its real meaningfulness by way of a discursive articulation of the Buddhist emptiness emptying itself into a unitary one, in the sense of the “self-identity of absolute contradictories,” that is, of the so-called Absolute and the Relative.

In other words, there has occurred in Nishida’s philosophical mind, let me emphasize, a new perception (or satori) of the Absolute as truly signifying the “Between the so-called Absolute and the Relative.” Now what is truly Absolute is not the Absolute itself but the Between-ness of the Absolute in close relation to the Relative world of creatures. However, it should be noted that this state of affairs comes out to be so only from within the realm of the Absolute as such insofar as the Absolute faces its own self-negation within itself. In this respect, Nishida’s logic of the self-identity of absolute contradictories (which, incidentally, is his version of the logic of coincidentia oppositorum), or of the place of absolute Nothingness, or of what I might call the Between the so-called Absolute and the Relative, is drastically distinct from Hartshorne’s all-inclusive logic or his version of Panentheism.

It is conspicuous that Nishida opts for his argument for the omnipotence/omniscience of God only from here. He writes beautifully:

Because God, as the self-negation of the Absolute, faces Godself in the manner of an inverse correspondence and is inclusive of absolute self-negation in Godself, therefore God exists through Godself. Because God is absolute Nothingness, God is absolute Being. Because God is at once absolute Nothingness and absolute Being, God is omnipotent and omniscient. Therefore, I hold that because there is Buddha, there are sentient beings, and
that because there are sentient beings, there is Buddha. In Christian terms, this would mean that because there is God the Creator, there is the world of creatures, and that because there is the world of creatures, there is God the Creator.

(Zenshu, XI, 398; trans. mine)

Herein is involved what I might call a metaphysical revolution—one similar to the case of Alfred North Whitehead’s insight into the nature of “creativity” as devoid of its own character and actuality and yet as lying at the base of all actual entities. I think I can explain what is at issue here as follows. In Nishida’s logic of the self-negation of the Absolute, the realm of pure potentiality (i.e., the place of absolute Nothingness) converts itself, ontologically, into the realm of actuality (i.e., the world of creatures) simply because it is, in Whiteheadian conceptuality, character-less in this thoroughgoing sense: you just cannot take the characterlessness to mean another character; hence, characterlessness is a dynamism, an ongoing movement, which is, I might say, a vertical, ontological process that goes beyond and above the “Zero Fallacy.” Likewise, you can authentically talk about the in-finite insofar as you “cease clinging” to the idea of “the infinite” as if it were the finite. You can face the reality of the in-finite only in and through the ongoing act of “ceasing clinging” to the idea of the infinite. Although everyone is a liar, let the in-finite be proved true!

It is precisely along these lines that Nishida attends to the old phrase that God is “nowhere and yet everywhere in this world” (Zenshu, XI, 398). The “nowhere” of the Deity is not a “somewhere” by the name of “nowhere”; hence, it is necessarily no-“no-where,” that is, “everywhere.” For Nishida, it is, accordingly, a Christian expression of the Buddhist paradox that is called the dialectic of “is” and “is not” at the same time (soku-hi). On the part of Buddhism per se, this dialectic is most manifestly expressed in these terms in the Diamond Sutra:

Because all dharmas are not all dharmas,
Therefore they are called all dharmas.
Because there is no Buddha, there is Buddha;
Because there are no sentient beings, there are sentient beings. (ibid., 399)

Nishida can find another expression of this same dialectic in the saying of the Zen master Myocho (Daito Kokushi):

Buddha and I, distinct through a billion kalpas of time,
Yet not separate for one instant;
Facing each other the whole day through,
Yet not facing each other for an instant. (ibid.)

What is discernible in these two Buddhist sayings, I perceive, is the appearance here and now of the Between the Absolute and the Relative. From this Buddhist perspective of the Between covering the purely potential and the actual and concrete, Nishida asserts that “a God who is merely transcendent and self-sufficient would not be a true God” (ibid.). For Nishida, God must be transcendent and at the same time immanent—an argument similar to Hartshorne’s mentioned earlier, but based upon a different rationale. In the immanent aspect of the Deity God is a thoroughgoing “kenotic” actuality who embraces “even a heinous man” (Zenshu, XI, 404)—and this, of course, not because God condones his evil but because God envisages his whole existence (evil as it is) against the background of the Between as that which connects in one breath the unrealized but realizable potentiality (i.e., the Future) and the realized actuality (i.e., the present), therefore as involving in itself at present a future possibility of Enlightenment.

III. How Can We Conceive of the Interrelatedness of Nishida’s Metaphysics of the Whence cum Hartshorne’s Metaphysics of the Whither to the Problem of “Creation” Cogently?: My Thesis of God as the Principle of Loyalty in the Universe Addressed

Thus far, I have depicted Hartshorne’s all-inclusive metaphysics in terms of his notion of Panentheism or Surrelativism and Nishda’s
metaphysics of the place of absolute Nothingness in terms of his notion of the self-identity of absolute contradictories, such as the Absolute and the Relative. Inasmuch as Hartshorne finds all things in the universe as contained in and understood by the consequent nature of God as the goal of the universe, I might designate his system of thought “metaphysics of the Whither.” By contrast, I might call Nishida’s system of thought “metaphysics of the Whence” in view of the fact that he is primarily concerned with re-envisioning the Absolute as including in itself absolute self-negation, thus and only thus tending to be compassionate toward even a heinous man.

It is important to note in this connection that in Hartshorne’s case, his all-inclusive metaphysics presupposes the causal efficacy of past experiences as impinging upon the present experience (the “concrescence” or the self-creative activity of each and every creature) which is then to be understood as a whole by the Deity. Accordingly, he does not seem to be wanting to explain it. By contrast, in the case of Nishida’s metaphysics of the Whence qua the place of absolute Nothingness (which, significantly enough, is not only an ontological principle but also an explanatory principle), it is important to note that this metaphysics provides the rationale of explicating how God’s causality is enabled to function by God’s omnipotence/omniscience, the question with which we began this lecture.

Now I would like to point out that it is precisely in this connection that what Nishida says in his second book Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness (1917) is tremendously important: “When absolute free will turns and views itself, or, in Boehme’s terms, when the objectless will looks back on itself, the infinite creative development of this world is set up.” In my rendering of Nishida (which I have come up with in my recent article mentioned at the outset), this means that God’s seeing into God’s own nature or the Godhead—that is, God’s supreme satori—might be designated as the very thing that gave rise to the big bang, namely, the first fluctuation in the [eternal] universe. In my opinion, this is the case of God’s loyalty, as it is cosmologically
significant in this context, to the Godhead (in the sense of the intra-Trinitarian relationality, *perichoresis*, which is to be designated, as by Meister Eckhart, as “Nichts” identifiable with Buddhist Emptiness) which is, paradoxically enough, the source of *creatio continua* as well. Here I concur with Brian Swimme when he says:

The universe emerges out of all-nourishing abyss not only fifteen billion years ago but in every moment. Each instant protons and antiprotons are flashing out of, and are as suddenly absorbed back into, all-nourishing abyss. All-nourishing abyss then is not a thing, nor a collection of things, nor even, strictly speaking, a physical place, but rather a power that gives birth and that absorbs existence at a thing’s annihilation. ¹¹

At any rate, in this interpretation of Nishida’s afore-mentioned dictum I am based upon a common understanding prevalent among Nishida scholars in Japan that Nishida came to radically re-envision his earlier philosophy of pure experience in *An Inquiry into the Good* (1911) from his new perspective appearing in the second volume, as containing in itself “God’s self-awareness” (i.e., *regressus*) as this paradoxically gives birth to the emergence of the universe (i.e., *egressus*) (see IRS. 141). It is important to recognize here that his practice of Zen meditation (which he began long before writing his maiden work) is now giving rise (although only through the radical re-envisioning taking place in the second volume) to this new metaphysical position in which God is conceived as, I might say, the supreme Zen meditation practitioner on a cosmic scale.

In sum, there are three stages that are involved in the problem of “creation” from my perspective of God as the principle of loyalty in the universe:

(1) God’s causality presupposes God’s own innermost introspection (which, I think, is what omnipotence/omniscience is all about for Nishida) in terms of what I call “God’s loyalty to the Godhead as this is unconditionally with us.”
(2) But why so? Because the Godhead, insofar as it is identifiable with Buddhist Emptiness, empties itself. That is, the Godhead never wants to be itself (i.e., Godhead an sich) eternally, but wants to cross out its status as Emptiness and to transform and convert itself into the Godhead “for us,” namely, the personal Deity or deus creans—that is, the Godhead “as” God.

(3) It is for this reason that now God (I mean, the personal Deity) can evoke loyalty/faith/worship in us creatures—the loyalty as embodied in the self-creative activity of ours.

This state of affairs we can depict in more precise terms from the perspective of process conceptuality (as it is concerned with the problem of “creation”) as when Whitehead writes about “envisagement by the underlying activity” as follows:

Finally, to sum up this train of thought, the underlying activity [coterminous with his mature notion of creativity], as conceived apart from the fact of realization, has three types of envisagement. These are: first, the envisagement of eternal objects; secondly, the envisagement of possibilities of value in respect to the synthesis of eternal objects; and lastly, the envisagement of the actual matter of fact which must enter into the total situation which is achievable by the addition of the future.\(^{12}\)

To me the third case of envisagement is important; and it turns out that there are three stages involved herein:

(1) The underlying activity (in my case, the Godhead an sich) envisages the actual matter of fact (i.e., whatever has been accomplished and is actual in the universe here-now) due, paradoxically, to its own self-introspection. At this vertical, ontological level of metaphysics we have lots of things to learn from Nishida.

(2) The envisagement at issue here covers in one breath the area of the accomplished matter of act (i.e., the primary dative phase)
entering into the total situation (which is the situation of the accomplished matter of fact plus the nascent concrescence). Here under the pre-concrescent, interim phase of creation, it is important to recognize anew what we have articulated in terms of the Between.

(3) The total situation is partly determined and partly indeterminate because it is finally achievable by the addition of the future (i.e., the nascent concrescence). Here at the private level of creation, what John B. Cobb, Jr, calls “the One Who Calls” is relevant, in the sense that God calls us to respond to the initial aims provided by God in order that we may accomplish ourselves in the midst of our task of self-creative activity.

In differentiating while at the same time uniting these three phases of creation we can, I believe, account for the problem of “creation” cogently enough. In *The Zero Fallacy and Other Essays in Neoclassical Philosophy* Charles Hartshorne says that “being is only an abstraction from becoming.” But from our perspective it appears that we creatures are at once existential and in becoming, or that we are envisagementally determined and yet free as the subjects of concrescence.

In my opinion, we cannot be creative without being primarily and fundamentally “with God” under our primitive dative phase first. This I learned from my teacher Katsumi Takizawa’s famous doctrine of the *Proto-factum* Immanuel. And, further, the *Proto-factum* has its own inner structure in which God is loyal to the Godhead qua Emptiness emptying itself, thus, and only thus, paradoxically tending to be evocative toward us creatures. This is my own thesis by which I think I can unite Takizawa’s doctrine to his mentor Nishida’s idea of the place of absolute Nothingness.
NOTES

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1. See Tokiyuki Nobuhara, “Wie können wir in der Metaphysik die vertikale und die horizontale Ordnung stimmig zueinander bringen? Uwe Meixner, Prozessdenken und Nishida-tetsugaku,” polylog: Zeitschrift für interkulturelles Philosophieren, 7, 2002, 33-41. My innermost gratitude goes to Prof. Wolfgang Tomaszitz for his invitation to an intercultural philosophical dialogue with Prof. Uwe Meixner (Regenburg) and also for his brilliant translation of my original manuscript in English into German. I am also deeply indebted to Prof. Anand Amaladass, the editor of the Satya Nilayam Chennai Journal of Intercultural Philosophy, a sister concern of POLYLOG Vienna, for his collaboration with the Vienna Society for Intercultural Philosophy in publishing my article in English in his journal in January, 2002.


14. Cf.: “The thing to notice is that, for the many to become one and be increased by one, the creative universe must take into account, or envisage, the existence of every new disjunctive plurality of completely attained creature before it can create, relative to each new disjunction, the dative phase of a new creature, which dative phase, since it is a finite extensive region containing within itself the reproduction, or causal objectification, of the plurality in question, is impure potency for that plurality of attained creatures to be synthesized into the constitution and subjective experience of a novel occasion” (Jorge Luis Nobo, “From Creativity to Ontogenetic Matrix: Learning from Whitehead’s Account of the Ultimate,” *Process Thought*, No. 8, 1998, 86).
